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Abstract—The performance of data delivery in wireless relay
networks (WRNs), such as delay-tolerant networks and device-to-
device communications heavily relies on the cooperation of mobile
nodes (i.e., users and their carried devices). However, selfish nodes
may refuse to relay data to others or share their resources with
them due to various reasons, such as resource limitations or
social preferences. Meanwhile, misbehaving nodes can launch
different types of internal attacks (e.g., blackhole and trust-
related attacks) to disrupt the normal operation of the network.
Numerous mechanisms have been recently proposed to establish
secure and efficient communications in WRNs in the presence of
selfish and malicious nodes (referred as non-cooperative WRNs).
In this paper, we present an in-depth survey on human-centric
communication challenges and solutions in the non-cooperative
WRNs that focuses on: (1) an overview of the non-cooperative
WRNs and introduction to various types of node selfish and
malicious behaviors, (2) the impact analysis of node selfish and
malicious behaviors on the performance of data forwarding and
distribution, (3) selfish and malicious node detection and defense
systems, and (4) incentive mechanisms. Finally, we discuss several
open problems and future research challenges.
Index Terms—Opportunistic Routing, D2D Communications,
Social-awareness, Resource Allocation, User Selfishness, Mali-
cious Behaviors, Attack Detection, Incentive Mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, individuals primarily use their handheld devices, such
as smartphones and tablets for daily business communications
and entertainment (e.g., mobile advertising, file sharing, and
gaming), which leads to exploding traffic over mobile net-
works. The global cellular traffic reached 7.2 exabytes per
month at the end of 2016, and it is expected to grow to
49 exabytes per month by 2021 [1]. Thus, it has become a
great challenge for the Internet providers and mobile network
operators to serve the booming traffic demand of cellular
networks. Meanwhile, mobile users in emergency scenarios
may not have access to the Internet due to some reasons, such
as limited coverage of cellular networks (e.g., 3G or LTE). To
overcome these problems, wireless relay networks (WRNs)
have emerged as a promising communication paradigm in
which the architecture of delay-tolerant networks (DTNs)
[2][3] is incorporated to establish device-to-device (D2D)
communications [4] between mobile nodes (i.e., users and their
devices). In WRNs, nodes in proximity can opportunistically
communicate and share their resources with each other using
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short-range and high-speed wireless interfaces, such as Wi-
Fi and LTE Direct, which can significantly reduce the traffic
of the cellular network. For instance, mobile social networks
(MSNs) [5] have emerged as a novel networking paradigm in
WRNs wherein the nodes’ social relationships and contextual
information are leveraged to enhance their communications
and improve the resulting network performance. WRNs have
many applications in different areas, such as mobile data
offloading [6], proximity services [7], public safety communi-
cations [8], and vehicular networks [9][10].
The primary goal of data forwarding and sharing protocols
in WRNs is to exploit the nodes’ contact, context, and social
information to improve the data delivery performance in
terms of different metrics (e.g., delivery ratio, delay, overhead,
and energy consumption). The majority of existing protocols
assume that mobile nodes willingly participate in data delivery,
share their resources with each other, and follow the rules of
underlying networking protocols. Nevertheless, rational nodes
in real-world scenarios have strategic interactions and may
exhibit selfish behaviors due to various reasons (such as
resource limitations, the lack of interest in data, or social
preferences). For example, in case a node has limited battery
resources or the cost of the network bandwidth delivered by
mobile network operators is high, it would not be willingly
to relay data for others until appropriate incentives are pro-
vided. Meanwhile, malicious nodes may attack the network
in different ways to disturb the normal operation of the data
transmission process. An adversary, for example, may drop
received messages but produce forged routing metrics or false
information with the aim of either attracting more messages or
decreasing its detection probability. This issue becomes more
challenging when some colluding attackers boost their metrics
to deceive the attack detection systems. However, dealing with
the non-cooperative behaviors of mobile nodes in WRNs is
very challenging because of the distributed network model and
intermittent node access to centralized authorities.
Recently, extensive analytical and simulation-based exper-
iments have been conducted to study the effects of mobile
nodes’ selfish and malicious behaviors on the performance
of data forwarding and dissemination in DTNs and D2D
communications underlying cellular network. Besides, several
distributed algorithms have been proposed to detect the nodes’
selfish and malicious behaviors and protect the network against
malicious attacks. Furthermore, a large number of incentive
mechanisms, such as reputation and rewarding approaches
have been developed in both DTNs and D2D communications
to either exclude selfish nodes from the data delivery process
or stimulate them to participate in data relaying.
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A. Prior Related Surveys
In the past few years, some survey articles have been presented
in the context of WRNs. The majority of existing studies
address the design requirements, platforms, and applications
of DTNs and MSNs [5], [11]–[14]. For instance, Kayastha
et al. [11] categorize MSNs into two types: infrastructure-
based and infrastructure-less (or opportunistic) and discuss
their architectures and characteristics. A number of studies
review data routing and dissemination protocols in DTNs and
MSNs [15]–[19] and categorize them into different classes
according to various factors (e.g., contact, context, and social
features). Youssef et al. [20] explore different routing metrics,
and Abdelkader et al. [21] evaluate the performance metrics
of some well-known opportunistic routing protocols. Zhu et
al.[22] study the positive (e.g., social similarity and centrality)
and negative (e.g., user selfishness) aspects of data delivery
algorithms in MSNs. The authors in [23][24] study the impact
of human mobility on the performance of opportunistic routing
protocols. The authors in [25]–[27] respectively explore human
behavior in social, temporal, and microblog networks. Silva et
al. [28] study different cooperative strategies and their appli-
cations in challenged networks. The authors in [29][30][31]
study design challenges of incentive strategies and their trade-
offs for data forwarding in wireless networks. Furthermore,
Ahmed et al. [32] study the services, technologies, and appli-
cations of event-based MSNs.
Recently, some articles study recent advances in D2D com-
munications. Asadi et al. [4] classify D2D communications
into in-band and out-band, i.e., communication on the cellular
and unlicensed spectrum, respectively, where the main differ-
ence is the interference caused by D2D nodes. Wang et al. [33]
investigate the key components and architecture of D2D-based
proximity services in MSNs and highlight their challenges and
existing solutions. Zhao and Song [34] provide an overview
of social-aware data dissemination approaches in MSNs and
D2D communications with respect to game theory, matching
theory, and optimization techniques. Gandotra et al. [35] study
the implementation challenges of D2D communications from
several aspects, such as resource allocation and interference
management. In addition, Ahmed et al. [36] study resource
allocation approaches in social-aware D2D communications
with respect to their channel information, communication type,
and networking technologies.
A couple of survey articles have explored security aspects
of human-centric communications in WRNs. Najaflou et al.
[37] study safety challenges in MSNs in three main groups:
security, trust, and privacy. Liang et al. [38] provide a brief
overview of MSN applications with respect to security and
privacy and highlight some future research challenges about
secure routing and denial-of-service attacks in MSNs. Further-
more, Zhang et al. [39] study various types of Sybil attacks
and their defense mechanisms in a broad context of wireless
networks. Haus et al. [40] present a survey on privacy and
security in D2D communications. Despite the fact that the
existing studies have outlined different aspects of WRNs, there
is no prior in-depth survey of communication challenges and
solutions in non-cooperative WRNs.
B. Contributions of this Survey
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first survey that
provides a comprehensive review of existing work on human-
centric communications in non-cooperative WRNs. Our major
contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We present an overview of non-cooperative WRNs and
introduce mobile nodes’ different selfish behaviors and
attack models.
• We survey recent studies that explore the impact of nodes’
selfish and malicious behavior on the performance of
data forwarding and distribution protocols in WRNs and
explore their detection and defense mechanisms.
• We study numerous incentive mechanisms in WRNs and
discuss their important characteristics.
• We discuss several open issues and highlight future
research directions regarding data forwarding and distri-
bution in non-cooperative WRNs.
C. Methodology
The main goal of this survey is to provide a structured and
comprehensive overview of human-associated communica-
tions in non-cooperative WRNs. In particular, we explore data
delivery in proximity-based networks under the circumstances
that some mobile nodes exhibit selfish and malicious behavior
to either maximize their utility or disrupt the data delivery
process. In Section II, we present an introduction to non-
cooperative WRNs with the aim of motivating the emergence
of protocols and mechanisms to deal with non-cooperative
behaviors in WRNs. Furthermore, we outline different forms
of nodes’ selfish and malicious behavior in data forwarding.
Next, we study data delivery challenges and solutions in non-
cooperative WRNs from three perspectives. In Section III,
we study proposals that analyze the impact of nodes’ selfish
behaviors on the performance of data delivery protocols. In
particular, we categorize existing methods into simulation-
based, theoretical, and hybrid methods and highlight their
principal solutions, specialties, and limitations in Table I.
In Section IV, we study selfish and malicious node detection
and isolation algorithms in WRNs where they aim to secure
data delivery protocols against nodes’ non-cooperative behav-
iors. We categorize the selfish node detection and isolation
methods into two classes (watchdog systems and social trust-
based systems) and highlight their major contributions, prop-
erties, and limitations in Table II. Next, we explore proposals
that aim to detect different types of node attacks in WRNs
and outline their principal contributions, major properties, and
shortcomings in Table III. In Section V, we study incentive
mechanisms that aim to promote the cooperation of nodes in
data relaying where we categorize existing methods into three
main classes: Tit-For-Tat, reputation-based, and credit-based
mechanisms. First, we introduce prominent Tit-For-Tat and
credit-based schemes and outline their major characteristics in
Table IV. Next, we classify credit-based mechanisms into three
classes (game-theoretic, security-based, and miscellaneous)
and highlight their principal solutions, incentive objects, and
limitations in Tables VI and V. We believe that this paper can
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Fig. 1. The organization of the remaining parts of the paper.
educate the research community and networking protocol de-
signers how to effectively deal with non-cooperative behaviors
of mobile carriers in next-generation wireless networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows (Fig. 1).
Section II provides an overview of non-cooperative WRNs
and introduces various selfishness and attack models. Section
III introduces different approaches that study the impacts of
node selfish and malicious behavior on the performance of
data forwarding and sharing protocols in WRNs. Section IV
discusses the selfish node detection techniques and attack
defense systems. Section V studies representative incentive
mechanisms that aim to either promote the cooperation of
selfish nodes or exclude them from the data delivery process.
Section VI provides several open problems and future research
directions, and Section VII draws the conclusion.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF HUMAN-CENTRIC
COMMUNICATIONS IN NON-COOPERATIVE WRNS
Fig. 2 illustrates an overview of human-centric communi-
cations in non-cooperative WRNs. As shown in the figure,
mobile nodes (or user equipments) in proximity can estab-
lish peer-to-peer communications to exchange data with each
other using short-range and high-speed wireless transmission
technologies (such as Bluetooth, ZigBee, WiFi-Direct or LTE
Direct) [41]. The communication between the nodes can be
in standalone D2D mode (or ad hoc mode) autonomously or
via network-assisted D2D communications with the control of
base stations (BSs) or core network. Meanwhile, the nodes
may sporadically have access to the Internet and service
providers (such as a trusted third party or credit clearance
center) via BSs or Wi-Fi hotspots. In this setting, the nodes’
social ties and relationships captured from their online social
network profiles or the nature of their mobility (e.g., contact
patterns or geographic information) can be leveraged to en-
hance their communications and capacity of the network.
Cooperative communications can improve the performance
of data delivery in WRNs and offload the traffic of the cellular
network. For example, mobile devices in D2D communica-
tions can cache popular content received from the cellular
network and share them with interested neighbor requestors,
which can improve the data delivery performance, increase
the network capacity, and offload the traffic of BSs. However,
some nodes might exhibit selfish behavior and refuse to
relay messages received from all or some other nodes or
share their resource with them because of different reasons,
such as limited resources (i.e., buffer, bandwidth, and energy
resources) or monetary cost. In addition, malicious nodes can
launch different forms of attacks, such as manipulating and
diffusing wrong information to deceive the nodes and disturb
their normal communications. Thus, we can classify mobile
nodes into three types: cooperative, selfish, and malicious
nodes. In general, the cooperative nodes follow the rules of
the underlying networking protocols, whereas the selfish nodes
consume the network resources but refuse to provide services
for all or some other nodes with the aim of maximizing their
own benefits. Besides, the malicious nodes attack the network
in different ways to disrupt the network normal functionali-
ties. In the rest of this section, we explain social-awareness
communications in WRNs and compare the characteristics of
DTNs and D2D communications. Next, we discuss different
selfish behaviors and malicious attacks that can be launched
by non-cooperative nodes in WRNs.
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Fig. 2. An overview of non-cooperative wireless relay networks.
A. Social-aware Communications in WRNs
Mobile nodes’ implicit (e.g., mobility information) and
explicit (e.g., online social network information) social char-
acteristics and relationships can accurately mirror their inter-
actions and relationships in the real life. Hence, socially-aware
wireless networking has emerged as a promising solution to
optimize various aspects of human-centric communications
in WRNs [42]–[46]. In particular, nodes’ different social
characteristics, such as social ties, community, and centrality
are primarily exploited to enhance different key technological
problems in cooperative communications underlying cellular
network [47][48]. For instance, nodes’ social network and mo-
bility information can be leveraged to select appropriate relay
nodes in D2D communications with the aim of improving the
data delivery success ratio while minimizing the communi-
cation overhead (e.g., see [49] and [50]). In addition, nodes’
social characteristics are exploited to address peer discovery
[51] and resource allocation [52] in D2D communications.
In contrast to cooperative networks, the social information
of mobile nodes can also be exploited to achieve secure com-
munications in non-cooperative WRNs. For instance, social-
based trust or reciprocity relationships between interacting par-
ties can streamline data delivery performance and protect their
communication against malicious attacks (e.g., see[53][54]).
In addition, the social features and behaviors of nodes can
help detect their possible selfish and malicious actions [55].
Furthermore, utilizing nodes’ social features can help model
their interactions and incentive mechanisms realistically with
respect to their similar and conflicting interests [56]. In this
paper, we particularly study proposals that leverage nodes’
social attributes and relationships across different aspects of
their communications in non-cooperative WRNs.
B. DTNs and D2D communications
Although mobile carriers in both DTNs and D2D com-
munications can establish opportunistic contacts to exchange
their messages, there are some distinct differences in the form
of their communications. Typically, there is no permanent
cellular infrastructure in DTNs and the research question is
how to efficiently deliver a message from a source node to its
destination node by choosing appropriate relay nodes. In con-
trast, the main goal in D2D communications is to efficiently
offload the traffic distributed by a cellular network through
D2D devices to interested nodes, which is applicable in new
business models and scenarios (e.g., pervasive social networks
and location-based services). In other words, there is no strict
publish/subscribe model in DTNs in comparison with the data
offloading mechanisms assumed in D2D communications. In
addition, DTNs primarily employ multi-hop relaying to deliver
messages to destination nodes, whereas D2D communications
apply single-hop or multi-hop cluster-based transmissions.
Furthermore, mobile nodes in DTNs communicate with each
other on an unlicensed spectrum, which is performed by the
devices autonomously. In contrast, D2D devices can use both
licensed and unlicensed spectrum under the controlled of the
BS or within the cooperation between the BS and encountered
nodes, which can cause D2D-to-cellular and cellular-to-D2D
interference [57]. Hence, resource allocation, peer discovery,
mode selection, and power management are major challenges
in D2D communications [58].
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C. Node Selfishness Models
Although cooperation among mobile nodes in proximity can
improve the data delivery performance in WRNs, some nodes
may exhibit selfish behavior and do not share their resources
with other nodes altruistically with the aim of maximizing
their preferred utility. The selfish behavior of mobile carriers
could have different reasons, such as resource constraints,
the lack of interests in messages, privacy concerns, or social
preferences. For example, in case a mobile node has limited
battery resources or the cost of network bandwidth delivered
by mobile network operators is high, it may not be willing
to consume its resources and relay data for all or some other
nodes until appropriate incentives are provided.
Different forms of node selfishness models have been con-
sidered in the literature. The authors in [59] propose dif-
ferent altruism distributions, such as uniform, degree-biased,
and community-biased to realize human selfish behaviors in
WRNs. Some studies identify a probabilistic selfish behavior
in which a selfish node may not participate in relaying a
message according to a probabilistic function. A number
of studies (e.g., [60]) define non-forwarding and partially-
forwarding selfish actions where a selfish node does not relay
messages to other nodes or only delivers the relaying messages
to their destination nodes. Panagakis et al. [61] introduce non-
copying (or dropping) and non-forwarding selfish behavior.
In addition, the authors in [62] define two types of selfish
nodes: strict and mild. A strict selfish node turns off its radio
interface after receiving its requested data items, whereas a
mild selfish node cooperates with others for a limited time
even after receiving its requested data. Besides, the authors
in [63] introduce egotistic nodes, which change the range of
their communication signals in different situations.
Despite various selfishness models and actions mentioned
above, a vast number of existing studies in non-cooperative
WRNs have explored the role of nodes’ social relationships
and preferences in their selfish behavior. Following the ho-
mophily phenomenon in sociology, it is revealed that mobile
nodes usually provide better services for those with whom they
have strong social relationships or similarities. For example,
nodes with similar interests and backgrounds tend to cooperate
with each other in data delivery, even if they have not had
direct contact with each other previously [64][65]. Thus, two
types of selfish nodes can be defined as follows:
• Individually Selfish (IS) nodes: IS nodes have socially-
oblivious selfish behavior and exhibit a uniform selfish
behavior to other nodes without considering the utility
of the nodes with whom they have social relationships
or common interests. For example, an IS node does not
consider the benefits of its friends in data sharing and
provides better services for nodes with early access times.
• Socially Selfish (SS) nodes: SS nodes alleviate the
degree of their selfishness degree based on their social
relationships or similarities to provide better services to
their friends or nodes with whom they have strong social
ties. In contrast, they are unwilling to provide forward-
ing services for strangers or nodes with different social
objectives or preferences with the aim of saving their
Fig. 3. Different types of node attacks in wireless relay networks.
buffer and energy resources. For example, SS nodes in
community-based DTN or D2D data offloading scenarios
are willing to cache and deliver messages to nodes in
the same community but refuse to relay the messages to
nodes in other communities.
D. Social Trust
Social trust is a powerful descriptor of friendship, honesty,
security, and integrity that can secure interactions between
mobile nodes in wireless networks. In particular, due to the
lack of a permanent central authority in WRNs, establishing
social trust relations between nodes (by leveraging their online
social network information, direct, and indirect interactions)
can promote trustworthy cooperation among them and protect
them against threats and attacks [66]. For example, social
trust can improve the performance of D2D communications by
asking the most trustworthy nodes in proximity (e.g., family
members, friends, or colleagues) to relay messages [67]. In
contrast, the lack of trust can make the nodes reluctant to co-
operate with each other due to different reasons ranging from
privacy concerns (e.g., not trusting to interact with strangers)
to resource constraints (e.g., energy and buffer limitations).
However, malicious nodes can attack the trust system, for
example, by exaggerating the reputation of other malicious
nodes or submitting bad recommendations against trustworthy
nodes [68] [69]. We study several recently proposed social
trust-based communications in Section IV.
E. Node Attack Models
Opportunistic communications and interactions among mobile
nodes in proximity are vulnerable to different types of attacks
(e.g., physical attacks, compromised credentials, and protocol
attacks) due to the open architecture of the network, node
mobility, and privacy issues. To deal with network attacks,
numerous protection and defense mechanisms have been de-
signed to guaranty the requirements of a secure commu-
nication, such as authentication, availability, confidentiality,
and integrity. Despite various attack and defense mechanisms
discussed in the literature, in this paper, we focus on different
forms of internal attacks (i.e., the attacks launched by nodes
with valid cryptographic credentials) that can disrupt the
normal communications between the nodes and the network
throughput severely.
As shown in Fig. 3, we categorize attacks launched by
malicious mobile nodes into the following types:
• Blackhole Attack: a blackhole adversary drops received
messages even if it has free buffer space to store them
but produces forged metrics (e.g., message delivery prob-
ability) to attract more messages or hide its real identity.
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• Greyhole Attack: a particular type of blackhole attack in
which a greyhole adversary drops a fraction of received
messages even if it has free buffer space but produces
forged metrics that makes it difficult for other nodes to
detect it. In a complex form of the greyhole attack, the
attacker drops some received messages and injects other
fake messages instead.
• Data Flooding Attack: a data flooding attacker injects
as many messages as possible into the network to overuse
the network resources (e.g., bandwidth, energy, and
buffer) and degrade the throughput. A flooding attacker
can attack the network in different ways. For example, it
may generate fake messages or copy the same message
destined for random or selective target nodes through
some victim relay nodes that have the highest popularity.
In certain cases, a flooding attacker may destine its fake
messages to non-existing nodes in order to make them
remain in the network longer.
• Wormhole Attack: a wormhole adversary receives mes-
sages in one location of the network and then moves
and replicates them to nodes in another part of the
network in order to pretend that messages are transferred
through fewer transmission hops. The main objective of a
wormhole attacker is to disarrange the topology views of
the network by providing fake neighboring information
and improve its position (e.g., its reputation).
• Sybil Attack: a Sybil attacker (or Sybil) generates a
large number of bogus identities or location information
to establish many fake links in the network with the
aim of manipulating its reputation or the bad reputation
of other nodes [70]. For example, a Sybil attempts to
disseminate spam and advertisements, produce wrong
reports, obtain a disproportionately high benefit from
the network without sufficient contribution, and steal the
other nodes’ private information. In some cases, a mobile
Sybil may contact other nodes to share the same social or
location information with different forged identities and
mislead their routing decisions. Dealing with the Sybil
attack becomes more challenging when compromised
colluding nodes augment the capability of Sybils.
• Social Trust-related Attacks: a malicious node can
attack a trust management mechanism in different ways
to disrupt its functionality. For example, it can launch
a self-promoting attack to improve its importance and
be selected as the service provider or relay node, but
then it refuses to provide the service or provide a
malfunctioned service. In addition, malicious nodes can
launch other types of trust-related attacks (such as bad-
mouthing or ballot stuffing attacks [69]) in the form of
recommendations to exaggerate the trust level of their
friends or ruin the reputation of unknown strangers or
well-behaved nodes. Thus, a robust trust management
mechanism should be designed to protect the trust level
of nodes against such attacks.
F. Common Data Delivery Protocols to Evaluate Human Non-
cooperative Behaviors in WRNs
In general, data forwarding and dissemination protocols in
WRNs employ multi-copy replication mechanisms to improve
the data delivery probability with the cost of communication
overhead. Broadly, multi-copy replication mechanisms can be
classified into two major classes: stateless and deterministic.
In the stateless protocols (e.g., Epidemic [71], Two-hop [72],
spray and wait (SnW) [73], and backpressure-based routing
[74]), mobile nodes make data replication decisions locally
without considering the properties of other nodes (e.g., their
delivery probability). In contrast, in deterministic protocols,
the nodes’ contact history (e.g., Prophet [75]) or social features
(e.g., Bubble Rap [76], dLife [77], and PIS [78]) are utilized
to choose optimal intermediate nodes and improve the data
forwarding performance in terms of important metrics, such
as data delivery ratio, delay, and communication overhead.
The majority of works we will discuss through the rest of
this paper employ the stateless protocols to evaluate the perfor-
mance and effectiveness of their solutions in non-cooperative
WRNs. We believe that it is because implementing the stateless
routing protocols is relatively straightforward. Additionally,
the impact of nodes’ different behaviors on data delivery
performance can be well demonstrated using the stateless
protocols.
III. IMPACT OF NODE SELFISH BEHAVIOR ON
OPPORTUNISTIC COMMUNICATIONS
Different forms of nodes’ selfish behavior can influence the
data delivery performance metrics (e.g., data delivery ratio, de-
lay, transmission cost, and resource consumptions) in different
ways. For example, the message dropping or non-forwarding
actions of selfish nodes in multi-copy routing protocols can
increase the delivery delay but improve the delivery overhead.
Moreover, selfish nodes can highly degrade the efficiency
of data offloading in D2D communications, especially when
seed nodes refuse to deliver the content to non-seed nodes
via opportunistic communications. In the literature, different
models and techniques have been employed to characterize and
estimate how routing metrics change in the presence of non-
cooperative nodes. We categorize the impact analysis methods
into three classes: theoretical, simulation-based, and hybrid
methods. In the following, we discuss the main contributions
of each work and highlight their major results.
A. Theoretical Methods
Several analytical methods have been proposed to analyze
the impact of nodes’ selfish behavior on the performance of
opportunistic communications. A considerable number of the-
oretical methods in this class have employed the continuous-
time Markov chain (CTMC) model to analyze the data delivery
process. In general, a CTMC model is characterized by a
state space and a transition matrix where the process starts
with an initial state and changes to another state according
to the probabilities of particular transitions in the transition
matrix. Fig. 4 shows a CTMC transition machine that models
a message relaying in a network with two non-overlapping
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Fig. 4. A sample two-dimensional CTMC model for the Epidemic routing
process with (M + 1) × (N + 1) transient states where state (0,0) is the
initial state and state (Dest) is the absorbing state [79].
communities V1, V2 with N and M SS nodes, respectively.
The transition process starts from state (0,0) which implies
that the number of the message copies in communities V1 and
V2 equals to 0. Once the number of the message copies is more
than 0, the message may be transmitted to the destination state
(Dest). Thus, a major question is how to obtain the transition
probability from each state to state (Dest) that can help derive
the message delivery performance metrics, such as the delivery
delay and cost.
Karaliopoulos [80] formulate message relaying in the Epi-
demic and Two-hop protocols using a two-dimensional CTMC
(2D-CTMC) model. In particular, deceleration factor metric
is devised to measure the deterioration of the delivery delay,
which is defined as the ratio of the expected delivery delay
when there are K selfish nodes versus the case all the nodes
are cooperative. The numerical results demonstrate that the
delivery delay in both the protocols increases as the number
of the selfish nodes goes up. Meanwhile, it is shown that
both the protocols are resistant against the selfish behavior
when it is probabilistic. For example, the deceleration factor
remains below 2 even in the presence of 70% of selfish
nodes with selfishness degree 0.5. Li et al. [81] design a 2D-
CTMC model to obtain the message delivery delay and cost.
The analytical results show that the non-forwarding and non-
copying actions have opposite impacts on the Epidemic and
Two-hop protocols. For instance, the non-copying action of
selfish nodes increases the delivery delay and cost in Two-
hop, whereas the delivery delay in Epidemic increases but the
cost does not change considerably.
Resta and Santi [82] model the routing process in the
Epidemic, Two-hop, and SnW protocols as a stochastic col-
oring process to derive the data delivery delay and com-
munication cost metrics. In particular, three levels of node
cooperation: fully cooperative, probabilistic cooperative, and
non-cooperative behaviors are considered. Based on the col-
oring process, a node can be in three states: uncolored (has
not received a message), colored active (has at least two
copies of the message), and colored inactive (has only one
copy of the message that can deliver to its destination). The
coloring process finishes when the destination node receives
the message and becomes colored. The results show that the
data delivery performance doubles even when a small portion
of nodes cooperates in message relaying in comparison to the
case all the potential forwarders drop messages.
While the above-mentioned studies only consider the nodes’
social-oblivious selfishness behavior, Li et al. [79] analyze the
impact of SS nodes on the Epidemic routing where the network
nodes are partitioned into two non-overlapping communities.
In particular, a 2D-CTMC is employed to model the message
relaying process. Besides, delay deceleration ratio and cost
enhancement ratio metrics are introduced to measure the
performance degradation of the data delivery delay and cost,
respectively. The results demonstrate that as the number of
selfish nodes increases, the delivery delay increases, but there
is more reduction in the delivery cost. Xiao et al. [83] apply a
2D-CTMC model to explore how IS and SS nodes affect the
performance of gossip-based data forwarding in DTNs. The
network is partitioned into two non-overlapping communities
where the nodes in only one community are IS. The results
show that the non-forwarding action of IS nodes reduces the
transmission cost more than increasing the delivery delay,
whereas the non-copying action of IS nodes degrades the
cost less than the delivery delay. Furthermore, the gossip-
based forwarding is robust to social selfishness because the
transmission cost decreases significantly at the cost of a slight
increase in the delivery delay.
B. Simulation-based Methods
Several existing studies employ simulations to explore the im-
pact of node selfishness on data delivery performance. The au-
thors in [60] explore the impact of the nodes’ non-forwarding
and partially-forwarding actions on the performance of Epi-
demic, SnW, and Prophet protocols in terms of the data
delivery ratio and delay. The experimental results demonstrate
that DTNs tolerate a high percentage of non-cooperative nodes
(20-40% or even 60%) without too much harm, even though
they still utilize the other nodes’ resources to deliver their
own messages. Meanwhile, synthetic random mobility models
are most vulnerable to less cooperation that implies that
DTNs are robust against the nodes’ non-cooperative behavior.
Comparatively, it is revealed that the performance degradation
of SnW is relatively higher than Epidemic and Prophet because
SnW generates a limited number of message copies.
Hui et al. [59] study the impact of nodes’ different altruistic
distributions (such as the percentage of uniform, normal,
degree-biased, and community-biased) on the performance of
opportunistic communications. The experimental results reveal
that a network setting with uniform, normal, or degree-biased
distributions can achieve almost 90% performance of a fully
cooperative network due to their multiple forwarding paths. In
addition, it is confirmed that the community-biased traffic can
further increase the robustness of the network. The authors
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Fig. 5. The belief-based uncertain interaction between nodes in Sig4UDD.
in [62] evaluate the performance of a publish-subscribe data
offloading system in the presence of the strict and mild nodes.
The performance results in terms of the energy consumption
and data delivery ratio demonstrate that in the presence of strict
nodes, the energy consumption decreases significantly at the
cost of losing some data delivery ratio. In contrast, under mild
selfishness, the energy consumption further decreases while
the delivery ratio increases.
While the studies above focus on the nodes’ social-oblivious
selfishness behavior, Bermejo et al. [84] study human altru-
ism in AppExp and WebExp applications with respectively
800 and 737 nodes considering the nodes’ remaining battery
level and social tie information. The experiments show that
nodes respectively exhibit 70% and 52% altruistic behavior
in AppExp and WebExp when a minor credit (1 dollar) is
awarded. Meanwhile, the nodes are not willing to relay data
received from others when their remaining battery level is
less than 10%. Xia et al. [85] explore the impact of IS and
SS nodes on social-based routing protocols under uncertain
node cooperation. In particular, a signaling game approach
(Sig4UDD) is proposed where Bayesian Nash equilibrium
and perfect Bayesian equilibrium are employed to analyze
the nodes’ one-stage and multi-stage interactions (Fig. 5).
Meanwhile, a belief system is established to help the nodes
predict the type of their encounters and decide whether to
forward a message to them or not. The experimental results
demonstrate that nodes in Sig4UDD can effectively establish
their beliefs based on their previous interactions that can
decrease the transmission cost significantly while improving
the data delivery delay. Similar to [85], Wang et al. [86]
employ random utility theory to model gossip diffusion of
rational nodes in social networks under uncertainty. Next, a
formal framework based on mean field theory is devised to
analyze the diffusion process. The results demonstrate that
small uncertainty can speed up gossip diffusing significantly.
A limited number of proposals study the impact of human
selfish behavior on the performance of D2D communications.
The authors in [87] consider an opportunistic data offloading
approach in network-assisted D2D communications in which
nodes download the contents from the BS and then decide
whether to share them with other nodes or not according to
their historical records. Next, a network formation game is
designed to model the dynamic characteristics of the nodes’
selfish behaviors wherein the gain and cost functions are
specified for downloading content via D2D communications
or cellular network. The simulation results show that the
Fig. 6. Community-based D2D communications underlying cellular network
in the presence of socially selfish relay nodes.
selfish behavior of nodes can degrade the offloading efficiency
significantly. In addition, the cost ratio between the cellular
and D2D transmissions, as well as the nodes’ access delays
and mobility patterns affect the performance gap significantly.
Wang [88] study human selfish behavior in community-
based D2D communications in which SS nodes in each
community participate in relaying contents received from the
BS to non-relay nodes with respect to their social relations, as
shown in Fig. 6. The study adopts a bipartite graph to obtain
a matching solution between the relay and non-relay nodes
when the cooperation degree of relay nodes and the number
of communities vary. The experiments show that SS nodes
degrade the system throughput with fewer mobile devices.
Besides, it is revealed that the highest performance gap occurs
when the number of relay and non-relay nodes are equal.
Similarly, Gao et al. [89] employ a time-varying graph model
to study the impact of IS and SS nodes on the performance of
data offloading in community-based D2D communications. It
is assumed that a BS transmits data to a helper seed node
and requests it to disseminate the data to the subscribers
or other seed nodes. Nevertheless, a selfish seed node can
exhibit selfish behavior in receiving contents from the BS
or forwarding them to subscribers. The experimental results
demonstrate that a few numbers of IS and SS nodes inside each
community do not affect the network throughput considerably,
especially in a network with a large number of communities.
C. Hybrid Methods
The majority of studies in this class employ theoretical ap-
proaches to model and analyze opportunistic data delivery
process and then conduct simulations to validate the theoretical
results. Manam et al. [63] apply ordinary differential equation
(ODE) model to analyze the impact of selfish nodes with prob-
abilistic non-forwarding and non-copying actions and egotistic
nodes (i.e., nodes with different communication ranges) on
the performance of the Epidemic and Two-hop protocols. The
numerical and simulation-based results in the presence of 50%
of selfish and 50% egotistic nodes show that the delivery ratio
goes up, the delay decreases, and the cost increases as the
number of nodes increases from 0 to 70.
Unlike [63] that only addresses IS nodes, Li et al. [90]
employ a 3D-CTMC model to evaluate the impact of the IS
and SS nodes on the performance of Two-hop multicast in
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Karaliopoulos
[80]
A 2D-CTMC to model the
message relaying process
√ × √ × × × √ √ ×
+ Considering both non-forwarding and
non-copying selfish actions
- Data delivery delay analysis only
Li et al. [81]
A 2D-CTMC to model the
message relaying process
√ × √ × √ × √ √ ×
+ the data delivery delay and cost
tradeoff analysis
- No comparison with previous works
Resta and
Santi [82]
A stochastic coloring
process to model the
message delivery
√ × √ × √ × √ √ √
+ Extensive analysis of the effects of
selfishness on delivery delay and cost
- No comparison with previous work
Li et al. [79]
A 2D-CTMC to model the
message relaying process
with social selfishness
× √ √ × √ × √ × ×
+ Analyzing the impact of selfishness
in community-based DTNs
- Only evaluates the Epidemic routing
Xiao et al. [83]
A 2D-CTMC model to
analyze the gossip
dissemination
√ √ √ × √ × √ × ×
+ Studying individual and social
selfishness, and system energy
- No comparison with previous work
S
im
u
la
ti
o
n
-b
as
ed
Keranen et al.
[60]
Evaluating the
non-forwarding and
partly-forwarding actions
√ × √ √ × √ √ √ √
+ Studying the selfish behavior of a
wide class of routing protocols
- The selfishness model is weak
Hui et al. [59]
Studying the different
distributions of human
altruistic models
√ √ × √ × × √ × ×
+ Analyzing different altruistic
behavior and message traffic models
- Data delivery ratio analysis only
Kouyoumdjieva
and Karlsson
[62]
Studying the effects of
selfishness on
publish/subscribe
dissemination
√ × × √ × √ × × √ + Introducing energy-aware selfishness
- The lack of design properties
Bermejo et al.
[84]
Studying the impact of
battery level and social ties
on routing performance
√ √ × √ √ √ √ × ×
+ Applying real-world scenarios and
applications in the experiment
- Size-dependent performance analysis
Xia et al. [85]
A signaling game to analyze
the impact of uncertain data
forwarding on routing
√ √ √ √ √ × √ × √ + Introducing a more realistic
selfishness model
- No consideration of device energy
Wang et al.
[86]
An approximation method
based on mean field game
to study data diffusion
× √ √ × √ × √ × × + Comply with a philosophical saying
for gossip diffusion in real social life
- No analysis of diffusion delay
Wang et al.
[87]
A network formation game
to analyze the opportunistic
D2D offloading
√ × × √ × × √ × ×
+ Introducing the first selfish-aware
D2D offloading model
- No consideration of SS nodes
Wang et al.
[88]
A matching solution to
analyze SS nodes on
community-based D2D
communications
× √ × √ × × √ × ×
+ The first work to analyze SS nodes
in D2D communications
- No evaluation of other metrics
Cao et al. [89]
Analyzing node selfishness
in the BS-to-device and
D2D communications
√ √ × √ × × √ × ×
+ Considering both IS and SS nodes
- Requires all the link information to
establish the time-varying graph
H
y
b
ri
d
Ip et al. [63]
An ODE model to analyze
probabilistic selfish behavior
√ × √ √ √ × √ √ ×
+ Considering nodes with different
transmission ranges
- No analysis of social properties
Li et al. [90]
A 3D-CTMC to model the
message multicasting
√ √ √ × √ × √ √ × + Considers both IS and SS nodes
- The network model is not general
Wu et al. [91]
An ODE model to study the
impact of IS and SS nodes
on routing
√ √ × √ × √ √ √ ×
+ Validating the theoretical results
using simulations
-Unrealistic routing assumptions
Sermpezis and
Spyropoulos
[92]
A generic model to analysis
the influence of SS nodes on
routing based on mobility
× √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
+ Analyzing social selfishness policies
- The nodes’ social ties are identified
based on only contact history
Sermpezis and
Spyropoulos
[93]
An asymptotic model to
analyze the impact of SS
nodes on the performance
of stateless routing
× √ √ × × × √ √ √
+ Analyzing delivery delay in
heterogeneous networking scenarios
- Data delivery delay analysis only
(“
√
” if the protocol satisfies the property, “×” if not)
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DTNs. To model the social selfishness, the network is divided
into three non-overlapping communities V1, V2, and V3 , based
on which the source and multicast destination nodes are placed
in V1 and V3 and the IS nodes are placed in V2. The numerical
results show that the data delivery delay increases as the
number of IS nodes increases. Additionally, it is concluded that
the non-copying action of SS nodes affects the data delivery
performance considerably. Wu et al. [91] apply the ODE
model to evaluate the influence of IS and SS nodes on the
performance of community-based DTNs using the Epidemic
and Two-hop protocols. It is assumed that the network is
divided into multiple communities where IS nodes do not relay
messages to other nodes in the same community, whereas SS
nodes relay messages to nodes in the same community. The
experimental results demonstrate that the data delivery ratio
decreases as the number of communities increases.
The authors in [92] study the impact of SS nodes on
opportunistic data delivery performance by modeling different
cooperation policies where the cooperation level of SS nodes
is identified based on their contact rates. First, closed-form
expressions are derived to approximate the expected data deliv-
ery delay with respect to a broad range of mobility scenarios.
Next, simulations are conducted to validate the theoretical
results using the synthetic and realistic mobility traces. The
numerical results demonstrate that complex selfishness policies
cannot achieve better performance than a uniform policy for
power versus delay tradeoffs, whereas they can optimize power
versus delivery ratio tradeoffs. The same authors in [93]
investigate the impact of SS nodes on the delivery delay in the
Epidemic, Two-hop, and SnW protocols with heterogeneous
contact distributions. The analytical expressions prove that a
first-order mean value approximation for the basic epidemic
spreading step becomes exact in large-scale networks.
Summary: Table I summarizes the important features of the
research we studied in this section. It can be seen that a limited
number of analytical techniques and tools (such as CTMC and
ODE models) are employed to study the impact of human
selfish behavior on the performance of data delivery protocols
in WRNs, in comparison to other fields, such as opportunistic
scheduling in opportunistic communication [94]. Meanwhile,
almost all of the existing studies explore the data delivery
delay and transmission cost parameters and do not study the
other important parameters, such as the delivery ratio and en-
ergy consumption. In addition, there is a lack of an analytical
technique to quantify the impact of human selfish behavior
on D2D communications. Furthermore, despite the fact that
a considerable number of simulation-based experiments study
the human non-cooperative behavior in DTNs, the impact of
human behavior in terms of different parameters (e.g., delivery
delay, transmission cost, and energy consumption) are not
explored in D2D communications sufficiently.
IV. SELFISH AND MALICIOUS NODE DETECTION AND
ISOLATION MECHANISMS
Detecting non-cooperative nodes and disseminating the detec-
tion information through the network can reduce the loss of
network resources. Nevertheless, designing an effective detec-
tion and defense system in WRNs is extremely challenging
Fig. 7. A general watchdog scenario in non-cooperative WRNs.
due to the intermittent node connectivity and dynamic network
topology. In other words, the misbehaving actions of selfish
and malicious nodes are spread in space and time, and the
observations of one node might not sufficiently indicate the
misbehavior of its encountered nodes. This issue becomes
more challenging when attackers collude with each other to
boost their metrics and deceive the detection system. In the rest
of this section, we discuss well-known selfish and misbehavior
detection and defense systems in WRNs.
A. Selfish Node Detection Systems
We categorize selfish node detection schemes into two
classes: watchdog systems and social trust-based communica-
tions. In the rest of this subsection, we introduce well-known
works in each category and discuss their properties.
1) Watchdog Systems: as shown in Fig. 7, trusted watchdog
nodes in watchdog systems analyze the traffic received from
their encountered nodes to decide whether they have selfish be-
havior in message relaying or not (direct watchdog). However,
inter-contact times (i.e., two consecutive contacts) between
nodes in WRNs can be quite long. Hence, the watchdog
nodes may not receive sufficient direct watchdog information
to judge the behavior of other nodes. Thus, they can share
their opinions about other nodes with each other that help
them detect the selfish nodes swiftly and accurately (indirect
watchdog). When a node is detected as a non-cooperative
node, it is called a positive detection (or positive); otherwise, it
is called negative detection (or negative). However, due mainly
to the wrong watchdog information disseminated by malicious
nodes, a watchdog node may detect a cooperative node as
non-cooperative (false positive) or a non-cooperative node as
cooperative (false negative) that can degrade the performance
of the watchdog system severely.
Although several watchdog systems have been designed for
wireless ad hoc networks (e.g., [95], [96]), they cannot be
applied to WRNs due to their unique characteristics. A major
reason is that the sender of a message in ad hoc networks
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can observe the relaying behavior of nodes in the delivery
path of the message due to the end-to-end node connectivity.
Thus, the sender node can detect the nodes’ selfish behavior
by analyzing the traffic on the message delivery path. In
contrast, the observation of a node in WRNs may not indicate
the selfish behavior of other nodes due to the intermittent
node connectivity. Therefore, the node has to investigate the
consistency of the history of contact and message exchange
records (observed directly or received from other nodes) to
detect selfish message droppers.
Recently, a number of cooperative watchdog systems have
been proposed in DTNs. The authors in [97] propose a contact
history-based collaborative watchdog scheme in which the
watchdog nodes use both the direct and indirect watchdog
information to detect selfish nodes. To reduce the impact of
false positives and negatives, a controlled mixed diffusion
method is applied where the positive detections are always
diffused but a fraction of the negative detections is dissemi-
nated. Additionally, a 2D-CTMC model is designed to evaluate
the detection time and ratio. The experiments show that the
proposed scheme reduces the detection time from 20% for a
very low degree of collaboration to 99% for higher degrees
of collaboration. The extension of [97] is CoCoWa [98] in
which a reputation scheme is designed to protect the watchdog
system against the wrong watchdog information generated by
malicious nodes.
Ayday and Fekri [99] propose a graph-based iterative algo-
rithm, namely ITRM, to detect and isolate message droppers
in DTNs. In ITRM, watchdog nodes store a rating table about
the reputation of other nodes, which is updated based on their
direct and indirect watchdog information. The rating table is
represented by a bipartite graph where a check vertex shows
a watchdog node, and bit vertices show all the nodes that
the watchdog node has received watchdog information from
them. When two nodes contact each other, they exchange
a receipt for each received message along with a signed
timestamp, based on which the watchdog nodes can detect
message droppers. However, ITRM uses a binary reputation
where the reputation (i.e., type) of nodes can change easily
if contradictory watchdog information is received. Similarly,
Dias et al. [100] propose a reputation-based cooperative
watchdog system to detect message droppers in which the
reputation of nodes is updated based on their relayed and
delivered messages. In addition, encountered nodes share their
opinions about other nodes with each other to improve the
detection performance. Finally, selfish and cooperative nodes
are punished or rewarded, respectively.
Zhu et al. [101] propose a probabilistic detection scheme,
namely iTrust, where a trusted authority (TA) checks the
behavior of nodes based on their forwarding history evidence.
To achieve a trade-off between the detection accuracy and cost,
a reputation system is designed in iTrust where nodes with
a good reputation are checked with a low frequency while
suspicious nodes are checked with a high frequency. Moreover,
an inspection game is played between an inspector (i.e., TA)
and an inspectee to find an optimal investigation probability
and ensure that message droppers can be detected with a high
accuracy and low communication overhead.
2) Social Trust-based Systems: establishing social trust
relationships between mobile nodes by leveraging their online
social information (explicit trust) as well as their interactions
or mobility properties (implicit trust) can help select trusted
and secured relay nodes, thus improve the data delivery in
WRNs [102]. In other words, social trust-based data relaying
can avoid selfish nodes, thus stimulating them to cooperative in
data forwarding [103]. In addition, it can protect the network
against social trust-related malicious attacks, which will be
discussed in Subsection IV-B5. However, establishing trust
relations and propagating them in infrastructure-less wireless
networks are very challenging because there is no centralized
authority. In this subsection, we introduce well-known social
trust management mechanisms in non-cooperative WRNs and
discuss their properties.
IRONMAN [104] is one of the first social trust-based
routing mechanism in which the nodes initially assign the
highest trust value to their social friends. Then, encountered
nodes exchange the history of their sent and received messages
with each other, based on which they decrease the trust level
of each other for each detected dropping message. Besides, a
node increases the trust level of its encountered node when
it receives a relaying message from that node. Additionally,
the encountered nodes exchange their opinion about the trust
level of other nodes with each other. However, IRONMAN
initially assigns the highest trust score to each node, and thus
selfish nodes have a chance to only forward their messages
selfishly until their reputation is higher than a threshold value.
To deal with this problem, in SENSE [105], nodes’ social
features, battery level, and message hop count are used to
identify their altruism. Next, two encountered nodes agree to
calculate the reputation of each other if their battery level is
above a threshold value. Then, if the nodes deduce that they
are non-selfish to each other, they exchange the history of their
sent and received messages as well as their opinion about the
reputation of other nodes with each other to faster detect selfish
nodes.
The authors in [106] propose a dynamic social trust man-
agement mechanism to secure and optimize DTN routing in
which the combination of quality-of-service (QoS) trust and
social trust are used to select trustworthy relay nodes. While
the delivery probability is considered to measure the QoS
trust, healthiness and unselfishness metrics are introduced to
measure the nodes’ social trust level. When two nodes contact
each other, they calculate the trust value of each other based
on their direct contact and indirect trust information. The
experiments using a stochastic Petri Net technique demon-
strate that this method outperforms some existing trust-based
and non-trust-based DTN routing protocols in terms of data
delivery and delay. Similarly, trust routing based on social
similarity (TRSS) [68] incorporates the concept of social
trust into DTN routing where the nodes’ common interests
and social similarities are used to quantify their trust level.
Next, nodes with higher social trust levels are selected as the
message relays. Chen et al. [69] use the concept of honesty,
cooperativeness, and community-interest to establish social
trust relations between nodes, based on which a social-aware
application can adjust the best trust-related parameters not only
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Herna´ndez-
Orallo et al.
[97]
A 2D-CTMC model to evaluate the
selfish node detection time and
overhead
× √ √ √ √ × √
+ Evaluation of the effects of false positives
and negatives on detection performance
- No consideration of malicious behavior
Herna´ndez-
Orallo et al.
[98]
A 4D-CTMC model to detect selfish
nodes and cope with malicious nodes
√ √ √ √ √ × √
+ Combines the collaboration with
reputation
- No consideration of social behavior
Ayday and
Fekri [99]
A graph-based iterative algorithm to
detect malicious nodes
√ × × √ × × √
+ Combines QoS trust and reputation
- No evaluation of the nodes’ selfish
behavior
Dias et al.
[100]
A cooperative selfish node detection
mechanism based on node reputation
× × × √ × × √
+ Realistic evaluation scenarios
- No evaluation of false positives and
negatives
Zhu et al.
[101]
A probabilistic misbehavior detection
scheme based on inspection game
√ √ √ √ √ × ×
+ Achieves a high detection ratio with low
communication overhead
- Depends on a centralized third party
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al
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Bigwood and
Henderson
[104]
A trust mechanism based on the
self-reported social networks to
detect selfish nodes
× √ × √ √ √ √
+ A simple benchmark detection method
- Selfish nodes have chance to only forward
their own messages before being detected
Ciobanu et al.
[105]
A social and content-based selfish
node detection scheme
× × × √ × √ √
+ Considers both individual and social
aspects of human altruism
- Considers a binary social tie relation
Chen et al.
[106]
A social trust management scheme
to minimize trust bias and maximize
the routing performance
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ + Deals with both selfish behavior and
trust-related attacks
- Lack of analytical evaluations
Yao et al. [68]
A trust mechanism based on the
social similarity to select trustworthy
relay nodes
√ × × √ × √ √
+ Exploits nodes’ contact history and social
features to identify their trust relationships
- No evaluation of false positives and
negatives
Chen et al.
[69]
An adaptive trust management
mechanism for social IoT systems
√ × × √ × √ √
+ Tunes the best trust parameters in
response to changing the system conditions
- Lack of analytical evaluations
Ometov et al.
[67]
A coalitional game approach to
cluster nodes based on their trust
level
× × × × × √ ×
+ Discussing several possible future
research directions
- No consideration of trust-related attacks
Chen et al.
[107]
A coalitional game to establish
trusted D2D communications based
on social ties
× × × √ × √ ×
+ Considers both social trust and social
reciprocity in relay selection
- Only considers in-band communications
Militano et al.
[108]
A coalitional game for multi-hop
content offloading in
network-assisted D2D
communications
× × × √ × √ ×
+ The combination of social relationships
and reputation to identify nodes’ trust level
- No consideration of trust-related attacks
Zhang et al.
[109]
A stoping theory to choose trusted
relay nodes in D2D communications
based on their physical and social
information
× × × √ × √ ×
+ An effective model to update nodes’
reputation and detect their selfishness
- Privacy concerns because of revealing the
nodes’ location information
Yan et al.
[110]
A rough set algorithm to select
trustworthy relay nodes based on
multi-dimensional trust relationships
× × × √ √ √ ×
+ The psychological structure of users are
considered
- No consideration of trust-related attacks
Cao et al.
[111]
A group-based video multicast
system based on social trust and
reciprocity in D2D communications
× × × × × √ √ + Employing real-world video traces
(“
√
” if the protocol satisfies the property, “×” if not)
for establishing secure communications but also maximizing
the network performance.
While the studies above focus on DTNs, a number of
recent studies have investigated the role of social trust in
D2D communications. Ometov et al. [67] explore how the
combination of human social-awareness and D2D commu-
nications can improve the communications performance and
service quality. In particular, they propose a social-aware
trusted D2D data delivery framework in which a coalitional
game approach is employed to cluster mobile nodes based on
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their social tie strength and the degree of proximity. The eval-
uation results demonstrate that the proposed framework out-
performs traditional cellular-only and network-assisted D2D
communications in terms of energy efficiency and degree of
connectivity. Similarly, Chen et al. [107] propose a coalitional
game model to establish efficient and secure D2D cooperative
communications by leveraging social trust and social reci-
procity. The experiments show that this approach achieves up
to 122% performance gain in comparison with the cellular-
only communications. Similar coalition formation solutions
are proposed in [108][111] to establish social trust-based
network-assisted D2D communications.
In addition to the coalition formation methods discussed
above, some other solutions have been proposed to select
trustworthy relay nodes in D2D communications. Zhang et
al.[109] propose a stopping theory to identify effective and
trustworthy relay nodes in D2D communications wherein the
nodes’ social and physical information is captured to establish
social trust relations among them. The experiments demon-
strate that the proposed scheme achieves up to 120% and
45% performance gain over the case without D2D cooperation
and random relay selection, respectively. Yan et al. [110]
propose a trust-oriented partner selection mechanism in D2D
communications in which multi-dimensional trust relations
between the sender and possible relay nodes is established by
evaluating their cognition, emotion, and behavior trust. Next,
a rough set decision-making algorithm is designed to choose
the most reliable relay node.
Summary: Table II summarizes the important characteris-
tics of the watchdog and social trust-based systems in WRNs.
It can be seen that almost all the watchdog systems rely on
nodes’ contact history, while the impact of the nodes’ social
relationships and preferences on the efficiency and effective-
ness of watchdog systems are not explored sufficiently. In
contrast to the watchdog mechanisms, the social trust-based
systems exploit nodes’ contact history and social relationships
to choose more reliable and trustable relay nodes in message
forwarding. Comparatively, most of the social trust-based
systems in DTNs are fully distributed, whereas the social trust-
based systems in D2D communications mainly take advan-
tages of the underlying cellular network to establish the trust
relationships between nodes and isolate selfish nodes. Besides,
the majority of the social trust-based systems in DTNs analyze
the impact of nodes’ malicious behavior (e.g., disseminating
false positives and false negatives) on the performance of
selfish node detection. While, the social trust-based systems
in D2D communications cannot protect the network against
malicious nodes’ misreporting or other trust-related attacks.
B. Malicious Node Attack Detection Mechanisms
In Section II-E, we introduced different types of attacks that
can be launched by malicious nodes in WRNs. In this subsec-
tion, we discuss well-known attack detection mechanisms.
1) Blackhole and Greyhole Detection Methods: blackhole
and greyhole are two common node attacks where an adversary
drops all or a fraction of its relaying messages but forges its
routing metrics to hide its malicious behavior. Although vari-
ous blackhole and greyhole attack detection countermeasures
have been proposed in wireless ad hoc networks (e.g., [112]
[113]), they rely on end-to-end node connectivity that may not
be applicable to WRNs.
Blackhole and greyhole detection mechanisms in WRNs
primarily investigate the consistency of nodes’ contact history
and message exchange records to secure their communications
and prevent the attackers from distributing falsified connec-
tivity metrics. The authors in [114] use encounter tickets
to detect blackhole attackers in which two nodes sign an
encounter ticket using their trusted private key identification
when they contact each other. Accordingly, encountered nodes
are required to submit their encounter tickets to their next
encounters that prevent the attackers from claiming non-
existing encounters. However, an adversary can still launch
advanced types of the blackhole attack, such as tailgating
wherein a node deliberately increases its contact frequency
with popular nodes to attract more messages. To combat such
attacks, a ticket-based prediction technique is designed in
which a node predicts the competency of its encountered node
to decide whether to forward a message to it or not.
While [114] investigates the contact history of nodes to
detect blackhole attackers in DTNs, Dini and Duca [115]
propose a reputation system where selfish nodes disseminate
reputation value 0 to never be chosen as a relay node,
whereas misbehaving nodes disseminate reputation value 1 to
attract more messages. When a node receives a message, it
updates the reputation of all nodes that the message relayed
throughout. To cope with misbehaving nodes, a survival model
is used in which a node periodically decreases the reputation of
other nodes if it does not receive a message from them within a
time period. In addition, Li and Cao [116] propose a detection
system wherein a node is required to share the list of its sent
and received messages with its next encountered node to help
them judge whether this node has dropped any message or
not. However, malicious nodes may manipulate their contact
records to avoid being detected. To deal with this problem, a
node is required to share a part of its contact records with other
nodes, based on which the nodes can analyze the consistency
of contact records received from different nodes and detect
misreporting attackers.
While the methods discussed above can only detect black-
hole attackers, Alajeely et al. [117] introduce a new type of
greyhole attack called Catabolism attack in which adversary
nodes drop some received messages and inject new fake mes-
sages instead. To deal with this attack, a defense mechanism
called Anabolism is proposed where a hash chain model is
applied to detect the malicious nodes. Furthermore, Diep and
Yeo [118] propose a statistical defense scheme, namely SDBG,
to detect both individual and colluding blackhole and greyhole
attackers. To detect the individual attackers, encountered nodes
are required to exchange their contact history that let the
other nodes judge their behavior. In particular, some sort of
forwarding ratio metrics are designed in SDBG that help a
judging node to compare the routing behavior of a judged node
against threshold values. If the judged node is detected as an
individual attacker, SDBG starts detecting possible colluding
attackers in two phases. In the first phase, judging node
identifies the potential colluders with the judged node based on
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the number of their received messages from the judged node.
In the second phase, the judging node uses the forwarding ratio
metrics to investigate the number of messages the judged node
has forward to the suspicions colluders. The simulation results
illustrate that SDBG outperforms the method in [116] with a
detection rate of at least 70%.
Saha et al. [119] discuss that exchanging table-based infor-
mation between nodes can cause high communication cost and
long detection time. Thus, they use special trusted nodes (TNs)
with long-range connectivity over the SnW protocol to detect
malicious nodes by addressing the questions what information
should be exchanged between TNs and how often. To this
aim, they consider three scenarios: (1) TNs only exchange
their contact information; (2) TNs exchange the information
of malicious nodes; and (3) TNs exchange the information
of malicious nodes along with additional information. The
experimental results demonstrate that scenario 2 reduces the
detection time by 26%, cost by 6%, and the detection ratio
by 15-25% as compared to scenario 1. In addition, scenario 3
reduces the detection time by 45% and the detection ratio by
10% with a slight increase in cost as compared to scenario 2.
2) Data Flooding Attack Detection Methods: the primary
goal of a flood attacker is to generate as many messages as
possible to congest the network and waste the resources of
other nodes. While several studies have attempted to alleviate
the flood attack in wireless ad hoc networks [120] and peer-to-
peer networks [121], they cannot be applied to WRNs because
they require a permanent centralized monitoring server or end-
to-end path information.
Recently, a number of studies have addressed the data
flooding attack in WRNs. Li et al. [122] study the impact
of flood attack on the performance of single-copy and multi-
copy DTN routing protocols and show that the data flooding
attack can waste more than 80% of the transmissions generated
by honest nodes in the presence of 5% of flooding attackers.
To deal with the flood attackers, a rate-limiting method is
proposed in which a node can replicate a limited number
of message copies. However, counting all the number of
messages generated by a particular node may not be possible
in WRNs because of the lack of a centralized center. Hence,
a claim-carry-and-check method is adopted where each node
claims the number of its generated or replicated messages
to other nodes. Thus, the other nodes can cross-check their
carried claims to detect inconsistent claims. Diep and Yeo
[123] propose an encounter-based mechanism to detect flood-
ing attackers without imposing strict limitations on nodes’
message generation rate. In particular, a burst-limit policy is
applied to restrict the flooding attack where the nodes’ normal
message generation pattern is still controlled using a rate-
limiting method, but they are still allowed to have a small and
short burst of new messages. To this aim, encountered nodes
are required to exchange the list of their send and received
messages with each other that can help them judge if another
node violates the burst-limit policy.
While the above-mentioned studies rely on nodes’ contact
history, Parris et al. [124] propose a social-based defense
mechanism against flooding attackers wherein each node is
required to sign its forwarding messages and attach the list of
its friends in each message. Thus, the trusted social friends of
the source node only can carry its messages. Nevertheless,
an attacker may spoof the header of a message to falsely
make its encountered node believes that it is relaying its
friend’s message. In a worse case, the attacker may spoof
multiple MAC-layer addresses to replicate a huge number of
messages to a particular node. To deal with these attacks, a
key distribution mechanism is designed in which a message is
discarded if it is not truly signed by a friend.
3) Wormhole Attack Detection Methods: a wormhole at-
tacker receives messages at one location of the network and
then tunnels and retransfers all or some of them to nodes at
another location in the network. In this way, the wormhole
attacker can disturb and manipulate the topology views of
the network. While several recent studies have addressed the
wormhole attack in traditional wireless ad hoc networks (e.g.,
[125]), a limited number of works have addressed the worm-
hole attack in WRNs. Ren et al. [126] propose a geographical-
based mechanism where the node mobility is utilized to detect
a forbidden topology. In this method, mobile nodes reduce
their transmission range for short time and then the nodes’
geometric relations are analyzed to detect wormhole attacks.
The evaluation results demonstrate that the detection ratio
goes up as the network density increases. Furthermore, it
is found that the detection ratio increases when nodes have
higher mobility. The authors in [127] propose a statistical-
based approach in which infrastructure-based nodes collect
and analyze the contact information of mobile normal nodes to
detect and localize wormhole attackers. The detection process
includes two phases: training and test. In the training phase,
the average number of contacts between nodes over a period
of time is calculated. Next, the testing phase checks if the
ratio between the current node contacts and the mean contact
number exceeds a threshold value.
4) Sybil Attack Detection Methods: a Sybil attacker (or
Sybil) generates a large number of bogus identities or location
information to establish many fake links in the network.
Several detection techniques have been proposed for wireless
networks that primarily use social network information (e.g.,
[128]) or cryptography techniques (e.g., [129]) to detect Sybil
attackers [70]. Nevertheless, detecting Sybils and establishing
a global trust in WRNs entails major challenges due to various
reasons, such as the poor knowledge of nodes about the
network’s global state.
In general, Sybil detection methods in WRNs explore nodes’
mobility and spatiotemporal information to detect Sybil at-
tacks. The authors in [130] consider a case where a Sybil
intentionally encounters its targeted nodes to enhance its
contact frequency and strengthen the weight of its social
relationships with them. The experiments demonstrate that
implementing successful Sybil attacks using mobility is costly
for a mobile Sybil because it needs to invest several hours to
infiltrate a community successfully. Liang et al. [131] propose
a sybil-resisted trustworthy service evaluation system, called
SrTSE, in which two types of Sybils can exist. First, users who
put a bad review about a service provided by a vendor while it
is good. Second, a vendor along with a group of users who put
good reviews about a bad service to increase its reputation. To
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF THE ATTACK DETECTION MECHANISMS IN WIRELESS RELAY NETWORKS
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Li et al. [114]
A contact ticket-based scheme to
detect message droppers
√ × √ × × √ √
+ Predicts the node competency based on a
belief system
- No consideration of colluding attacks
Dini and Duca
[115]
The integration of reputation and
probabilistic routing to detect
attackers
√ × × √ × √ √
+ Designs an aging method to determine
the nodes’ reputation
- The lack of analytical evaluations
Li and Cao
[116]
A method that checks the
consistency of contact records to
detect message droppers
√ √ √ √ × √ √
+ Can detect colluding misreporting nodes
- No evaluation of false positives and
negatives
Alajeely et al.
[117]
A hash chain model to detect nodes
that drop messages or inject fake
messages
√ × × √ × × √ + Introduces a new attack model
- Weak simulation settings
Pham and Yeo
[118]
A statistical method to detect
individual and colluding droppers
√ √ √ √ × √ √ + Considers different contact manipulation
models
Saha et al.
[119]
A lightweight detection scheme
based on some trusted nodes
√ × √ × × √ ×
+ Achieves a better trade-off between the
detection time and overhead
- relies on long-range wireless connections
F
lo
o
d
in
g
A
tt
ac
k
Li et al. [122]
A rate-limiting method to detect
inconsistent node claims about the
number of replicated messages
√ √ √ √ × √ √
+ Less communication, computation, and
storage costs
- No comparison with previous work
Diep and Yeo
[123]
A rate-limiting method to detect
flooding attacks that allows
legitimate burst traffic
√ × √ √ × √ √ + Can detect the burst traffic violation
- The lack of analytical evaluations
Parris and
Henderson
[124]
A social-based authentication system
to detect flooding attacks
√ × √ √ √ √ √ + Considers various attack models
- Evaluation with only one attacker
W
o
rm
h
o
le
Ren et al.
[126]
A geographical method to exploit the
presence of a forbidden topology
√ √ × × × × √ + A fully distributed detection method
- Detection needs at least three nodes
Pham and Yeo
[127]
A statistical analysis method to
detect and localize wormhole
attackers
√ √ √ × × × ×
+ Detection mechanism does not rely on
the number of nodes
- relies on infrastructure nodes
S
y
b
il
A
tt
ac
k
Trifunovic et
al. [130]
Study various types of Sybil attacks
and evaluating their effectiveness
√ × √ × √ × √
+ The valuation of four benchmark Sybil
defence systems
- No consideration of colluding attackers
Liang et al.
[131]
A trustworthy Sybil-resisted system
to detect the service review attacks
√ √ √ × √ √ √ + Resists the review attacks without relying
on a third authority
Sun et al.
[132]
A security mechanism against
attackers that report forged virtual
locations
√ × × × × √ ×
+ measures metrics in client side but
removes Sybils on the server side
- No evaluation results
Quercia and
Hailes [133]
A social-based Sybil detection
mechanism based on node ranking
√ × × × √ √ √
+ Applying different ranking techniques
- The possible wrong detection of an
honest node as a Sybil
Chang et al.
[134]
A gateway-breaking algorithm to
remove suspicious attack edges with
high centrality
√ × × × √ × × + Each node carries small social profiles
- relies on a centralized server
Zhang et al.
[135]
A social-based detection method
based on nodes’ abnormal contacts
and pseudonym unstable behaviors
√ √ √ × √ √ ×
+ Detection of colluding Sybils
- relies on a server to store nodes’ contact
information
T
ru
st
-r
el
at
ed
A
tt
ac
k Chen et al.
[106]
A dynamic trust management
mechanism that is resilient against
major trust attacks
√ √ √ × √ × √
+ An application-level trust optimization
technique to discard less trustworthy
recommendations
Chen et al.
[69]
An adaptive social trust mechanism
that deals with several trust-related
attacks
√ √ √ × √ × √
+ Resilience against attacks even in
extremely hostile environments
- No comparison with relevant methods
Yao et al. [68]
A secure routing protocol that
tolerates different trust-related attacks
√ √ √ × √ × √
+ Provides incentives for malicious nodes
- no detailed descriptions about protecting
against trust-related attacks
(“
√
” if the protocol satisfies the property, “×” if not)
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prevent these attacks, SrTSE assumes that a user can only put
one review about a vendor in a short period of time. Thus, if
a user puts several reviews with different pseudonyms about
a vendor at a particular time, it will be considered as a Sybil.
Sun et al. [132] propose a geographical mechanism to detect
Sybils that report forged virtual locations. In particular, a two-
dimensional coordination system is designed on the server side
that obtains the set of Euclidean distances between nodes and
generates a set of candidate nodes for routing. In case a Sybil
node forges an unreal location, a high dimensional location is
generated as output inferring that the node is a Sybil node.
A couple of existing works exploit nodes’ social network
information to detect Sybil attacks. MobID [133] deals with
Sybil attackers who may produce several fake identities but
have a few real-life relationships. In MobID, a node enlists
the identity of its encountered nodes in two small networks:
the network of friends and network of foes. Thus, the node
explores the social similarity between the friends and foes
networks to decide whether an unknown contacting node
launches a Sybil attack or not. Chang et al. [134] consider a
community-based MSN where both Sybils and well-behaved
nodes exist in the network. In addition, a local ranking system
is employed to identify trust and distrust relations among
nodes. Thus, a node stores two random social profiles: a trust
profile and a distrust profile. When two strangers contact each
other, they exchange their trust profile with each other to
calculate the trust and distrust levels of each other, based on
which they can decide whether another one is Sybil or not.
Zhang et al. [135] introduce a social-based Sybil detection
scheme in which contact patterns and pseudonym behavior
of nodes are investigated to detect Sybils. Since the storage
and computational capabilities of mobile devices are limited,
cloud servers are utilized to process the nodes’ contact traces
and detect Sybils.
5) Social Trust-related Attack Detection Methods: the so-
cial trust relationships between mobile nodes can be exploited
to establish reliable and secure communications in WRNs.
Nevertheless, malicious nodes falsify the trust level of their
owns or their friends in order to attract more services or
messages) but later refuse to provide the promised services.
Besides, they can launch a colluding attack to spoil the good
reputation of well-behaved nodes. In general, three major trust-
related attacks in the context of WRNs have been considered
in the literature: self-promoting attack where an adversary
aims to promote its trust level, bad-mouthing attack in which
an adversary ruins the trust level or reputation of other
(well-behaved) nodes, and ballot-stuffing attacks wherein an
adversary exaggerates the trust level of other malicious nodes.
To deal with these attacks, the authors in [106] investigate the
consistency of the encounter tickets received from different
nodes based on a metric called healthiness social trust (that
is the belief of a node whether another node is malicious or
not) to identify the self-promoting attacks. Moreover, the con-
sistency of trust recommendations provided by other nodes is
checked to detect the bad-mouthing and ballot-stuffing attacks.
Similarly, the authors in [69][68] check the consistency of
nodes’ direct and indirect trust recommendations to detect the
trust-related attacks.
Summary: Table III summarizes the main features of the
attack detection techniques. It can be seen that a few numbers
of the blackhole and greyhole attack detection mechanisms
(i.e., [116] and [118]) can protect the network against col-
luding message droppers. In addition, nodes’ social features
and relationships are not considered in the existing blackhole
and greyhole attack detection mechanisms. Besides, a lim-
ited number of data flooding and wormhole attack detection
mechanisms are proposed in WRNs where only [124] uses
nodes’ social features to detect malicious attackers. In contrast,
almost all the Sybil detection methods primarily take nodes’
social relationships into account to detect Sybil attackers.
Nevertheless, a few numbers of them (e.g., [131] and [135])
can detect the colluding Sybil attackers. Furthermore, the
trust-based attack detection mechanisms mainly apply nodes’
contact and social information to identify both untrustworthy
individual and colluding nodes. While almost all the attack
detection schemes are designed for DTNs, detecting malicious
nodes in D2D communications with respect to their specific
characteristics needs further explorations.
V. INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
Mobile nodes may not be willing to share their resources with
each other and participate in data relaying unless an appropri-
ate incentive is provided. However, designing an effective and
fair incentive mechanism in WRNs is extremely challenging
because mobile nodes do not have complete information about
the network’s global state. Furthermore, nodes with different
resource constraints and preferences may require different
types of incentives to cooperate with each other in data
delivery. The ultimate goal of an incentive scheme is to make
the rewarding mechanism incentive-compatible implying that
a node obtains the highest reward when it has honest behavior.
Broadly, existing incentive mechanisms can be classified into
three categories: tit-for-tat (TFT)-based, reputation-based, and
credit-based schemes. In the rest of this section, we study well-
known incentive schemes in each category and characterize
their main features.
A. TFT-based Incentive Mechanisms
The main idea in TFT-based mechanisms is to force nodes
to exchange the same number of messages during an oppor-
tunistic contact. In other words, TFT-based mechanisms aim to
ensure that mobile nodes provide better forwarding services for
cooperative nodes but avoid selfish nodes. Shevade et al. [136]
propose a TFT mechanism for DTNs in which the concepts
of generosity and contrition are employed to respectively
overcome bootstrapping (i.e., who starts the cooperation) and
exploitation (i.e., when another node exploits) problems. In
this work, encountered nodes exchange their contact informa-
tion periodically, based on which a source node can calculate
the forwarding path of its messages. Finally, when a message is
delivered to its destination, intermediate nodes in the delivery
path are awarded. The simulation results show that the data
delivery ratio increases up to 60% in comparison with a fully
cooperative scenario. Similarly, the authors in [137] propose
a barter-based approach where encountered nodes exchange
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, 2018 17
the list of their messages with each other. Next, they identify
candidate messages and their forwarding priorities. Finally,
they exchange their messages one by one until all of them are
processed or their connection is lost. However, the message
exchange methods in [136] and [137] can cause deadlocks
in case nodes do not have the same number of messages.
Meanwhile, the value of messages is not considered in their
incentive mechanism.
To deal with above-mentioned problems, MobiTrade [138]
allows nodes to exchange messages if they do not have the
same number of messages. In MobiTrade, the value of a
message is identified based on the number of nodes that are
interested in the message and nodes’ cooperation degree. In
addition, a buffer allocation technique is applied that helps a
node to split its buffer for each channel based on its knowledge
of future demand. Similarly, Zhou et al. [139] propose a TFT-
based content dissemination scheme for publish-subscribe sys-
tems in which the order of forwarding messages is identified
based on a content utility function. Specifically, the utility of
a message for a certain node is identified based on the number
of nodes interested in the message, node contact probability,
and the cooperation level of nodes.
A number of recent studies employ the TFT approach to
promote the cooperation of nodes in D2D communications.
Hsu and Duan [140] propose an equal-reciprocal mechanism
for data sharing in D2D communications where D2D nodes
are grouped based on their physical information. Next, each
node in a group can share the same number of content with
each other. The experiments show that this method not only
guarantees the fairness in content sharing but also maximizes
the individual utility of the nodes. Additionally, D2D Fog-
ging [141] is a collaborative task offloading and execution
mechanism in which a set of TFT resource constraints and
an energy budget constraint is introduced to stimulate over-
exploited and free-rider nodes to participate in data sharing.
The TFT resource constraints ensure that a node can utilize
the resources of other nodes if it shares more resources with
the others. Furthermore, Lyapunov optimization methods are
developed to minimize the energy consumption of D2D nodes
with respect to those incentive constraints. The simulations
demonstrate that the energy consumption of nodes reduces by
30-40% in comparison to a case each node executes its tasks
locally. Mastronarde et al. [142] employ an online supervised
learning algorithm that helps a node learn its cooperation
policy and make a decision whether to relay messages received
from other nodes or not. The experimental results reveal that
the network achieves the highest performance when there exist
many nodes with high energy resources to relay messages.
B. Trust and Reputation-based Incentive Mechanisms
In the trust and reputation-based incentives, mobile nodes as-
sign appropriate reputation to each other based on their direct
trust relationships or indirect trust recommendations provided
by other nodes. Eventually, better services are provided for
nodes with high reputation or strong trust relationships. Under
these circumstances, the nodes are stimulated to relay mes-
sages received from other nodes to gain enough reputation so
that they can get help from other nodes. However, identify-
ing the actual reputation of nodes in WRNs is challenging
because the nodes cannot observe the behavior of each other
thoroughly. Meanwhile, malicious nodes can manipulate their
reputation for pretending that they have participated in data
delivery.
MobiGame [143] is a user-centric reputation system wherein
a node submits the receipts of its relaying messages to the
source and destination nodes to obtain credits. A message for
an intermediate node can be a good bundle if the node can
forward the message before it expires or a bad bundle if the
message is close to being expired. It is assumed that both
selfish and malicious nodes exist in the network where the
selfish nodes do not return the relay evidence to the previous
relay nodes. Meanwhile, the malicious nodes distribute bad
bundles to other nodes to waste their resources. To establish a
fair interaction, a game-theoretic model is designed in which
the costs and utilities of forwarding and receiving good and
bad bundles are analyzed using perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Similarly, IRONMAN [104] applies nodes’ self-reported social
network information to initialize their reputation. When two
nodes A and B contact each other, they exchange their contact
history, message-forwarding history, and the reputation of
other nodes with each other that can help them update their
opinions about the reputation of each other and other nodes.
Once the reputation of one of them, say A, is less than a
threshold value, B discards messages received from A until
A improves its reputation by relaying messages received from
other nodes.
While the reputation mechanisms proposed in [143]
and [104] are fully distributed, MobiCoop [144] designs
reputation-based incentives for hybrid DTNs in which nodes
can contact each other through both service-oriented and
opportunistic communications. Each node uses both direct and
indirect observations to update the reputation of other nodes. In
particular, three parameters including battery level, the Internet
connectivity, and cooperation degree are used to calculate the
reputation of a node. For example, the highest reputation value
is awarded to a node that has a low battery level and access to
the Internet, but it is still willing to cooperate with other nodes.
However, MobiCoop depends on a centralized web service that
may not be available in distributed DTNs.
Summary: Table IV summarizes the main features of
our studied TFT-based and reputation-based incentive mech-
anisms. It can be seen that the TFT mechanisms stimu-
late mobile nodes in both DTNs and D2D communications,
whereas almost all the reputation-based schemes focus on
promoting node cooperation in DTNs. Comparatively, TFT-
based methods can work well when the network traffic is high,
but they cannot provide fairness if encountered nodes do not
have the same number of messages to exchange. Meanwhile,
the message selection process in TFT-based mechanisms can
affect their effectiveness in terms of the message delivery ratio
significantly. In contrast, the performance of reputation-based
mechanisms highly depends on the direct observations of
nodes and the distribution of recommended-based reputations
[145].
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TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF THE TIT-FOR-TAT AND REPUTATION-BASED INCENTIVE MECHANISMS
M
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Reference Principle of proposed solutions Incentive objective Specialties (+) and limitations (-)
T
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T
at
Shevade et al.
[136]
An incentive mechanism that
incorporates the generosity and
contrition into the routing
Maximizing the individual utility
of nodes
+ Extensive evaluations using both
synthetic and real-world traces
- No consideration of fairness
Buttyn et al.
[137]
A barter game model to promote
node cooperation
A node can obtain a message if it
gives a message in return
+ Considers the value of messages
- Limited analytical results
Krifa et al.
[138]
A mechanism that allows nodes to
trade its relaying messages and buy
its interested messages
Maximizing the expected utility of
each stored message for future
encounters
+ Provides a customized resource allocation
strategy for each node
Zhou et al.
[139]
A content-based incentive
mechanism that stimulates nodes to
transmit their messages to interested
nodes in publish/subscribe systems
Maximizing the future trading
value of a stored message
+ Selects forwarding messages based on
their value and nodes’ cooperation level
- Applies a complex content matching in
the message selection process
Hsu and Duan
[140]
An equal-reciprocal incentive
mechanism for social group-based
data sharing in D2D communications
Maximizing the utility of nodes,
which is the amount of contents a
node uploads minus those it
downloads from the network
+ No need to compute nodes’ sharing
probabilities in advance
- Caching capacity of nodes is not
considered
Pu et al. [141]
A cooperative task offloading and
execution framework in D2D
communications
A node can use the resources of
other nodes if it shares more
resources with the others
+ The framework is lightweight and
operates dynamically according to the
system’s current information
Mastronarde et
al. [142]
A supervised learning algorithm that
help nodes adapt their cooperation
policy in D2D message relaying
Maximizing the utility of nodes,
which is the difference between a
node’s message forwarding utility
and energy consumption
+ Considers different mobility and relay
budget classes
R
ep
u
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o
n
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Wei et al.
[143]
A game-theoretic scheme to
stimulate nodes and resist attacks
Maximizing the individual utility
of nodes in message forwarding
+ Considers both security and fairness
- Limited analytical and simulation results
Bigwood and
Henderson
[104]
A social-based trust mechanism to
identify node reputation
Maximizing the reputation of
nodes based on their cooperation
history
+ The establishment of trust relationships
between the nodes using their social
information
- The lack of theoretical analysis
Silva et al.
[144]
A generalized system to stimulate
cooperation in mobile applications
Maximizing the battery life of
mobile devices
+ Using real application prototypes in the
evaluations
- Relies on a web service to manage the
node reputation
C. Credit-based Incentive Mechanisms
Credit-based incentive schemes employ different forms of
virtual credit to reward the cooperative nodes where the
rewarding is commonly managed by a third-party credit clear-
ance center (CCC). The idea is that a node is rewarded credit
for relaying messages received from other nodes or sharing
its resources with them where it can later use its credit to
pay other nodes for achieving its own utilities. In this way,
selfish nodes are not rewarded if they do not relay messages
for others, and thus they cannot afford to buy the forwarding
service of other nodes.
Broadly, existing credit-based incentive mechanisms can
be categorized into two classes: game-theoretic and security-
based mechanisms. The game-theoretic schemes aim to estab-
lish a win-win credit assignment situation among interacting
nodes, whereas the security-based methods attempt to ensure
the security of credit. In addition, there are some miscellaneous
credit-based mechanisms that do not fall in the game-theoretic
and security-based mechanisms. In the following, we present
well-known credit-based mechanisms in each category.
1) Game-theoretic Credit Mechanisms: game-theoretic
methods are widely applied to characterize the cooperations
and competitions among rational mobile nodes with conflicting
interests in wireless communications [146] [147]. For example,
a BS can set constraints on the transmission parameters in D2D
communications so that mobile nodes compete or cooperate
with each other to reuse the radio resources efficiently. In
general, a game in WRNs consists of a set of players (i.e.,
mobile nodes and BSs), rules, strategies, and payoff (or
utility) where each player chooses a strategy with the aim
of maximizing its utility. The payoff is normally calculated
based on the difference between the reward and cost of
relaying a message (e.g., resource consumptions). Assuming
that mobile nodes are selfish and rational, a binding agreement
or equilibrium point should lead to a win-win situation where
no player can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating
from the equilibrium. In the rest of this subsection, we first
study non-cooperative game-based credit schemes, followed
by introducing the cooperative game-based credit schemes.
Stackelberg Game-based Credit Schemes: Stackelberg
game is commonly played between a BS (i.e., leader) and
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mobile nodes (i.e., followers) in which the BS has an incentive
to share a channel with some nodes if it is profitable. The BS
decides the price, and the nodes choose the transmission power
and channel given the charging price. The utility of the BS can
be defined as its throughput plus the price it charges, whereas
the utility of the nodes is the difference between its throughput
and the cost that it pays to the BS for using the channel [148].
Sugiyama et al. [149] propose a two-stage Stackelberg
game-based pricing scheme wherein a network operator de-
cides how much it should pay to mobile nodes if they
participate in data delivery. First, the operator announces the
total reward and the minimum number of required participating
nodes. Next, candidate nodes play the game to decide whether
they want to cooperate in data forwarding or not. Finally, the
operator shares the reward among the collaborative nodes if
their number is higher than the required value. The cost of
relaying a message by a node is identified based on its storage
and energy consumptions, and their revenue is identified using
a prospect theory. Finally, backward induction method is used
to analyze the tradeoff between the cost and revenue and find
the Nash equilibrium. Chen et al. [150] model the interactions
between a BS and mobile nodes as a Stackelberg game in
which the BS aims to minimize its rewarding cost, and mobile
nodes aim to maximize their utility by choosing an appropriate
caching decision. Particularly, an iterative gradient algorithm
is applied to find the Stackelberg equilibrium and maximize
the utility of both the BS and nodes. A similar Stackelberg
game-based incentive scheme is proposed in [151].
Some existing credit-based mechanisms employ Stackelberg
game to optimize quality-driven multimedia video sharing in
WRNs. Wu and Ma [152] propose an incentive scheme for
distributing video files in which an interested node (leader)
publishes a request to receive a video file by declaring a total
credit for the delivery. Next, all the participants (followers)
compete with each other to deliver the video file and earn
credit. Since each video frame could increase the quality of
the reconstructed video file, the destination node measures
the value of each video frame using a utility function and
reward each participating node based on its total contributions.
The authors in [153] and [154] employ Stackelberg game
to design incentives for video sharing in network-assisted
D2D communications in which the game is played between
a multimedia content provider or BS as the leader and nodes
with video contents as the followers (see Fig. 8). The objective
is to maximize the benefits of the leader while stimulating
the followers to participate in data sharing. Wang et al. [153]
propose a Stackelberg game-based source selection and power
control solution where higher power and price are assigned to
important packets to increase their delivery probability. Thus,
the BS decides which devices to select and how much to pay
for their provided radio resource. To this aim, Stackelberg
equilibrium is employed to efficiently allocate the optimal
power to the selected devices. Wu et al. [154] employ nodes’
social and mobility features to select appropriate relay nodes
that can efficiently distribute the video contents to interested
peers. Next, a Stackelberg game is played between the BS and
selected nodes to maximize their utility.
Auction Game-based Credit Schemes: auction is a popular
Fig. 8. An illustration of video content sharing via network-assisted D2D
communication using Stackelberg game.
incentive mechanism for scenarios in which the value of a
service or trading item is undetermined. In a typical auction,
a seller first announces the auction, and buyers respond to the
auction in terms of biding. Next, the seller identifies the result
of the auction and assigns the resources to the winners. Xu et
al. [155] propose a sequential second price auction to allocate
spectrum resources in a network with a BS and multiple D2D
devices where the spectrum resource units are auctioned off
by D2D devices. In each round, the D2D devices offer a bid
based on the value of the current resource unit, and then the
BS allocates the unit to a device with the highest bit value
but pays the second highest bid. The game continues until
all the resource units are sold. The utility of a device is the
difference between the total value of spectrum units obtained
and the total payment. This work is extended in [156] where
the game is played among a BS, cellular nodes, and D2D
nodes. In particular, a reverse iterative combinatorial auction
mechanism is modeled to efficiently allocate the spectrum
resources and reduce the intra-cell interference wherein the
buyers are motivated to offer multiple bids on combinations
of resources iteratively and the seller asks the prices in each
round. The experiments demonstrate that the system sum
transmission rate increases as the number of D2D devices and
resource units increases.
A major problem with the solutions in [155] and [156] is
that D2D devices have to submit the game information (e.g.,
prices and costs) in each round of the game, while one of
them will receive the reward finally that wastes their energy.
To deal with this problem, Huang et al. [157] propose a
sequential posted pricing method in which the BS announces
the auction by sending a posted price to the devices and assigns
the resource unit to only one owner in each round. In this way,
the BS stops activating the rest of devices because there exists
already an active owner accepting the offer. The experiments
show that this method achieves a better tradeoff between the
BS’s cost and the number of active devices.
Hajiesmaili et al. [158] propose an auction-based incentive
scheme for load balancing in D2D-enabled cellular networks
where the main goal is to dynamically shift the portion of
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the traffic of heavily-loaded cells to other under-utilized cells.
To this aim, an online procurement auction mechanism is
proposed in which multiple devices submit bids, and the BS
evaluates the bids and purchases a subset of the resource units
to satisfy the load balancing requirement while minimizing the
social cost. The experiments demonstrate that the proposed
scheme achieves a near offline-optimal performance.
Bargaining Game-based Credit Schemes: bargaining is
a cooperative game approach in which the main goal is to
fairly divide a certain surplus or credit among game players
through negotiation. In the context of WRNs, bargaining
game-based credit schemes have been extensively employed
to model message trading between encountered mobile nodes
with respect to their different criteria and preferences. Ning et
al. [159] consider a scenario in which mobile nodes willingly
relay their interested messages but expect credit for relaying
messages that they are interested. Since a credit is awarded
only to the first deliverer and none of the nodes want to
waste their resources, they design a two-player bargaining
game where the encountered nodes negotiate over the value
of their messages with respect to their delivery probability.
Specifically, Nash bargaining equilibrium is employed to find
an optimal solution, yielding the players exchange messages
with the maximum gained credit. Similarly, self-interest-driven
(SID)[160] proposes a two-player bargaining game for ad
distribution wherein the players can trade both ad packets and
virtual checks attached to each ad packet. In particular, the
Nash bargaining equilibrium is applied to find a Pareto optimal
point where both the players can reach a binding agreement.
However, the rewarding mechanism in [159] and [160] are not
fair because only the last-hop final deliverers are rewarded.
Wu et al. [161] propose a bargaining model to stimulate
selfish nodes to cooperate in probabilistic routing protocols.
The message trading is motivated by a marketing concept in
which a message as a good is traded from a node with lower
delivery probability to another node with a higher delivery
probability. Thus, the current carrier of a message (seller)
bargains with another node (buyer) over the value of the
message in some rounds until an agreement on the price is
reached, or they finally disagree. To identify the best strategy
profile, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium is applied that
helps the players to reach an agreement in the first round.
A number of bargaining schemes consider the sender of a
message as a buyer who wants to buy the forwarding service of
the receiver who is a seller. Li et al. [162] design a two-player
bargaining game assuming that the buffer and energy level of
nodes are limited. First, the buyer offers price a considering
its free buffer, current wealth, and the message time-to-live
(TTL). In contrast, the seller offers price b with respect to
its resources and the wealth. Next, they either agree to trade
the message with price
(a+b)
2 if a≥b or disagree if a < b.
Furthermore, a bidding function is designed in a way that the
buyer offers a high price when it is rich. In addition, the seller
offers a high price when its resources are limited and a lower
price when it is poor and needs to guarantee the forwarding
of its own messages. Similarly, Jedari et al. [163] propose an
alternating-offers bargaining game, namely GISSO, in which
the buyer and seller value the forwarding service based on
their individual and social utilities where the utility of the
messages is identified based on their social tie strength and
message appraisal. Next, they negotiate over the service value
in some rounds until they reach an agreement or the game is
over. In GISSO, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is applied
to establish a win-win condition between the nodes where
backward induction is employed to identify the best strategy
for the players. Similar bargaining-based incentive schemes
have been proposed in [164] [165].
Coalition Formation Game-based Credit Schemes: coali-
tion formation is a cooperative game approach in which a set
of players (e.g., mobile nodes) agree to act as a single entity
to gain a higher payoff, which is called coalition value. Han
and Poor [166] study data forwarding in DTNs by highlighting
that nodes on the boundary of the network (boundary nodes)
are not willing to cooperate with backbone nodes in data
relaying. To deal with this problem, the concept of core is
employed to establish stable coalitions in which the boundary
and backbone nodes in a coalition have the incentive to
cooperate with each other in data transmission. Next, they
propose a routing protocol based on the coalition and repeated
games, which improves the network connectivity by about
50%. Similarly, Akkarajitsakul et al. [167] design a coalitional
game to stimulate the cooperation of selfish nodes wherein
the nodes decide either join or leave a coalition based on their
individual payoffs. The individual payoff of a node is identified
based on the delivery delay of their messages received from the
BS and the cost incurred by this node for relaying the messages
to other nodes. Using a Markov chain model to evaluate the
stability of the coalitions, the experiments demonstrate that the
nodes achieve a non-zero payoff.
A couple of coalitional game-based incentive schemes aim
to design efficient content distribution and resource allocation
protocols in D2D communications. Zhang et al. [168] design
a merge-and-split coalitional game with a transferable payoff
(i.e., utilities like money are allocated to the players in
the coalition) to efficiently allocate the spectrum resources
between D2D and cellular devices. The utility of the D2D
and cellular devices is defined as the sum transmission rate
they can achieve through the resource blocks allocated to them.
Hence, the game is divided into several sub-games where each
sub-game addresses the resource allocation problem of one
resource block. Since the nodes aim to maximize their utility,
they have an incentive to form a strong group and win their
preferred spectrum resources. In contrast to [168], Zhu et al.
[169] employ a non-transferable coalition formation game (i.e.,
different players have different interpretations of utilities) for
energy-aware content sharing through D2D communication.
Similarly, Xiao et al. [170] model a Bayesian overlapping
coalition game with non-transferable payoffs for efficient
spectrum resource allocation.
Some studies exploit nodes’ social features to form strong
coalitions in D2D communications. The authors in [111][172]
employ nodes’ social tie information (e.g., social trust and reci-
procity) to form stable coalitions, based on which D2D devices
are stimulated to share their resources with each other, and
the BS can share the spectrum resources efficiently. Similarly,
Zhao et al. [171] propose a coalition game-based incentive
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TABLE V
SUMMARY OF THE GAME-BASED CREDIT MECHANISMS
Game approach Incentive objective Analytical tools Achieved performance
Stackelberg game
Sugiyama et al.
[149]
Chen et al. [150]
Yin et al. [151]
[149]-Attracting more nodes by the operator
while minimize losing their energy and buffer
[150]-Minimizing the cost of BS while
maximizing the utility of nodes
[151]-Maximizing the sum rates of D2D devices
while guaranteeing the cellular nodes’ data rate
requirement
[149]-Backward induc-
tion
[150]-Subgame perfect
equilibrium
[151]-Successive con-
vex approximation
[149]-A win-win relationship between
operators and mobile nodes
[150]-The caching scheme is beneficial to
D2D devices if their requested pattern is
more heterogeneous
[151]-Achieves high performance while
reducing the overhead of cellular nodes
Auction game
Xu et al. [155]
Xu et al. [156]
Huang et al. [157]
Hajiesmaili et al.
[158]
[155]-Maximizing the sum rate of the BS and
the nodes’ obtained resources while minimizing
the nodes’ payments
[156]-Maximizing the network sum rate by al-
lowing cellular nodes to share their resources
[156]-Minimizing the overhead of the BS and
the energy consumption of D2D devices
[158]-Fulfilling load balancing requirement with
the minimum social cost
[155]-Subgame perfect
equilibrium
[156]-Integer linear
program
[157]-Backward
induction
[158]-Mixed integer
linear program
[155]-High performance on the system sum
rate, efficiency, and fairness
[156]-Superior to the random allocation,
high system efficiency, and stable over
different parameters of nodes and resources
[157]-A better tradeoff between the BS’s
cost and the winning percentage of nodes
[158]-Reduces the cost by 45% compared
with an alternative heuristic
Bargaining game
Ning et al. [159]
Ning et al. [160]
Wei et al. [161]
Li et al. [162]
Jedari et al. [163]
Xu et al. [164]
Li et al. [165]
[159]-Maximizing the reward of sender nodes
[160]-Gaining a balanced credit while distribut-
ing as many ads as possible
[161]-Earning higher credit balance
[162]-Maximizing the node utility based on the
buffer space and TTL
[163]-Maximizing the node utility considering
the message TTL, delivery delay, and social tie
[164]-Maximizing the node utility based on the
buffer, energy, and TTL
[165]-Saving the forward capability of nodes to
serve the fitness messages
[159][160][165]-Nash
bargaining theorem
[161][163][164]-
Subgame perfect
equilibrium
[160]-Reduces the transmission cost while
maintaining a good delivery ratio and delay
[161]-Up to 75.8% gain in data delivery in
comparison with a non-incentive routing
[162]-Reduces the buffer consumption
while delivering messages before the
expiration
[163][164]-A good data delivery ratio and
delay in the presence of selfish nodes
[165]-Saves the network bandwidth and
buffer while keeping a high delivery ratio
Coalition game
Han et al. [166]
Akkarajitsakul et al.
[167]
Zhang et al. [168]
WZhu et al. [169]
Cao et al. [111]
Xiao et al. [170]
Zhao and Song [171]
Wang et al. [172]
[166]-Establishes stable coalitions in which
backbone and boundary nodes fairly cooperative
[167]-Maximizing the nodes’ payoffs
[168]-Nodes intend to maximize their utility,
hence they have an incentive to form strong and
stable coalitions
[169]-Physically neighboring nodes form coali-
tions to minimize their energy consumption
[111]-Maximizing the utility of spectrum shar-
ing by stimulating nodes in a coalition to coop-
erate with each other
[170]-Each node chooses a specific BS to max-
imize its transmit rate per bandwidth price
[171]-Minimizing the power consumption of
nodes while satisfying their power budget
[172]-BS maximizes the system sum rate while
D2D devices maximize their individual payoffs
[166]-Market fairness
[167]-Markov chain
model
[168]-Max-coalition
order
[170]-Matching theory
[171]-Coalitional graph
game
[172]-Defection
function
[166]-The network connectivity is improved
by about 50%
[167]-Nodes achieve higher payoff
comparing to a case they act alone
[169]-All nodes participating in D2D
content sharing achieve positive utilities
[111]-Improves the nodes’ perception
quality of mobile video multicast effectively
[170]-Improves the system performance,
especially in a large coverage area with a
large number of D2D devices
[171]-Power consumption is almost optimal
in a small-scale D2D network
[172]-Improves the system performance
up to 93% in compare to the case without
community cooperation
Algorithmic game
Cai et al. [173]
Maximizing the reward of only when they hon-
estly report their encounter probability
Sequential stopping
rule
Achieves higher data delivery ratio with
low overhead
Evolutionary game
El-Azouzi et al.
[174]
Lena Cota et al. [175]
Wang et al. [176]
[174]-Maximizing the probability of success
[175]-Tolerating node selfishness while achiev-
ing high system performance
[176]-Maximizing sum of all nodes’ utilities
Evolutionary game the-
ory
[174]-Reaches the equilibrium point using
the nodes’ local estimations
[175]-Improves the bandwidth overhead by
22% in a live streaming use case
Minority game
Chahin et al. [177]
An optimal performance tradeoff between the
delivery ratio and resource consumption
Nash equilibrium Reaches the equilibrium point using the
nodes’ local estimations
Repeated game
Huang et al. [178]
Barua et al. [179]
[178]-Maximizing the payoffs of BSs as players,
which are the payoffs from both cellular and
D2D communications using radio resources
[179]-Maximizing the utility of both BS and
D2D devices in the presence of selfish nodes
[178]-Nash equilibrium
derivations
[179]-Nash equilibrium
[178]-Improves the system sum data rate
and sum gain
[179]-Maximizing the utility of the BS and
D2D devices while resists selfish deviations
Mean filed game
Li et al. [180]
Stimulate devices to truthfully reports the num-
ber of chunks they receive
Mean field equilibrium Implementation on Android devices illus-
trates its efficient performance
Signaling game
Zhang et al. [181]
Maximizing the monetary benefit of nodes while
guaranteeing a non-zero payoff for the BS
Separating equilibrium Improves the system sum transmission rate
Network formation
game
Wang et al. [87]
Maximizing the individual payoffs of nodes Pairwise stability The performance gap between selfish and
selfless nodes becomes smaller as the
communication cost of cellular and D2D
transmissions increases
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, 2018 22
mechanism in D2D communications where the objective is to
minimize the total power consumption while satisfying nodes’
social incentive constraints.
Other Game-based Incentive Approaches: other types of
game-based credit mechanisms have been proposed in DTNs.
Cai et al. [173] incorporate algorithmic game theory into
the Two-hop protocol where a sequential stopping rule is
employed to select the best relay nodes with maximum reward.
Next, a second-price auction game is applied to identify the
reward value in which a relay node can get the maximum
reward if it reports its routing metrics honestly. Once a
message is delivered to its destination, the source node rewards
the intermediate nodes in the delivery path. The authors in
[174] employ an evolutionary game to promote the cooperation
of nodes in the Two-hop protocol. Similarly, Wang et al.
propose a simple but effective incentive approach based on
evolutionary game theory in community-based opportunistic
networks wherein nodes voluntarily participate in message
relaying and punish other non-cooperative nodes. In addition,
an entry fee is received from nodes who want to participate
in relaying messages in a community. The theoretical exper-
iments prove that the efficiency loss of this scheme is 48+M
where M is the number of network nodes. Chahin et al. [177]
employ minority game to efficiently reward mobile nodes with
respect to their mobility and resource consumption. The game
aims to select a fraction of relay nodes (i.e., the minority) that
are willing to participate in relaying a message on behalf of a
source node under imperfect state information. The objective
is to achieve an optimal performance tradeoff between the
delivery probability and resource consumptions.
A number of other game-theoretic incentive approaches are
proposed in D2D communications. Huang et al. [178] propose
a repeated game for inter-cell scenarios where a D2D link is
located in the overlapping area of two neighboring cells. In
particular, the BSs are considered as the game players that
compete for the resource demands of D2D devices where their
utility is using the radio resources for both cellular and D2D
communications. Barua et al. [179] design a repeated game
for cooperative content sharing in which a D2D node receives
contents from the BS and broadcasts them to interested nodes.
Since selfish nodes do not cooperate in data forwarding, the
game takes the nodes’ cooperation level into account to select
the best content carriers. While nodes with high cooperation
level are rewarded by the BS, selfish nodes are punished in
the next round of the game by giving their interested contents
through cellular links. Li et al. [180] design a mean filed
game to encourage truth-telling about individual nodes states
by paying monetary payments in a D2D real-time content
streaming scenario. Furthermore, Zhang et al. [181] propose
a signaling game-based incentive scheme for D2D content
distribution wherein the main objective is to maximize the
nodes’ monetary profits while guaranteeing a non-negative
utility for the BS.
Summary: Table V summarizes the incentive objectives,
analytical tools, and the major performance results of our
studied game-theoretic credit schemes. It can be seen that
the Stackelberg game-based incentive mechanisms mainly
model the interactions between a BS, cellular nodes, and
D2D nodes where the main objective is to efficiently allocate
the spectrum resources, minimize the cost of the BS while
maximizing the utility of cellular and D2D nodes. The auction
game-based methods primarily aim to maximize the system
sum transmission rate where the nodes can obtain maximum
resource units with minimum payments. While the existing
Stackelberg and auction game-based incentive approaches
focus on D2D communications, the bargaining game-based
mechanisms model message trading between mobile nodes
where Nash bargaining and subgame perfect equilibrium so-
lutions are mainly employed to find the equilibrium points. In
addition, the coalition formation game solutions model content
distribution in multi-hop cluster-based D2D communication
where the main objective is to stimulate nodes inside the
coalitions to participate with each other in data distribution.
Furthermore, the other game-based incentive approaches aim
to stimulate D2D devices to collaborate in data sharing with
each other while allocating the spectrum resources efficiently.
2) Security-based Credit Mechanisms: Some existing stud-
ies incorporate security issues into credit mechanisms to
protect them against various internal attacks (e.g., edge in-
sertion and edge removal) in which malicious nodes strive to
maximize their reward but reduce the reward of honest nodes.
SMART [182] is a well-known secure pricing scheme in
which the concept of layered coin is employed to secure the
rewarding and achieve fairness. First, the source of a message
generates the first layer of the coin to indicate the credit
value and rewarding policy. Next, each intermediate node adds
a new layer to the coin by attaching its digital signature
to show its participation in relaying the message. Once the
message is delivered, nodes in the delivery path share the
credit according to a profit-sharing model. However, malicious
nodes may insert or remove fake layers or collude with each
other to gain extra rewards. To overcome these attacks, a layer
concatenation technique is designed in which the information
of the previous and next layers are attached to the current layer
to protect the layered coins against such attacks. Similarly, Lu
et al. [183] employ the concept of layered coin to secure the
credit assignment in which the source nodes reward the nodes
in the delivery path of successfully delivered messages. To
achieve fairness, nodes participated in relay a message obtain
a reputation even if the message is not successfully delivered
to its destination. Chen et al. [184] introduce contribution time
to reward relay nodes in the earliest delivery path of messages
where the contribution time is the period of time between the
receiving and forwarding of a message by a relay node. Using
this method, a malicious node has no incentive to launch the
edge insertion, removal, or content manipulate attacks because
only nodes in the earliest delivery path receive credit.
Some security-based credit schemes aim at detecting layer
insertion and removal attacks. Threshold incentive scheme
[185] securely rewards the intermediate nodes for relaying a
message where a time order-preserving aggregated signature
method is applied to detect the layer insertion attack. MuRIS
[186] applies a rule to thwart the edge insertion attack in
which the reward for relaying a message through an n-hop
path must be equal or higher than the total rewards gained via
an insertion attack.
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3) Miscellaneous Credit Approaches: in addition to the
game-theoretic and security-based mechanisms, some mis-
cellaneous credit-based schemes have been proposed in the
literature. Guan et al. [187] address the appearance of poverty
nodes in DTNs in which SS nodes with strong social relations
preferably choose each other as intermediate nodes to forward
their messages, hence they gain more credit. Thus, it becomes
difficult for nodes with fewer social relations to get sufficient
rewards so that they can afford the cost of their forwarding
messages. To deal with this problem, a taxation strategy
is employed to fairly redistribute the credit among nodes
and avoid the existence of poverty nodes. Mei and Stefa
[188] propose Give2Get Epidemic and Give2Get Delegation
protocols based on a cryptographic proof-based technique to
stimulate SS nodes to relay messages received from their
non-social nodes. CAIS [189] aims to stimulate IS and SS
nodes to participate in message relaying by designing different
charging and rewarding strategies for IS and SS nodes. In
particular, social and non-social credit are rewarded to a node
when it relays a message received from a node in the same
community or other communities, respectively. Furthermore, a
data replication controlling mechanism is designed, based on
which the number of messages a node can replicate is limited
based on its social and non-social credit.
Seregina et al. [190] design a reward-based incentive
scheme for the Two-hop routing where the source of a message
rewards only the first deliverer. Thus, intermediate nodes
decide whether or not to relay a message based on the
information provided by the source node. Specifically, three
strategies are analyzed where the source can share information
about the message in three settings: full (the number and ages
of the message copies), partial (the number of the message
copies), and no information. The experimental results reveal
that the expected reward paid by a resource node is the same
irrespective of the information provided to the relay node.
Meanwhile, it is optimal for the source node to pretend that it
is the first message replicator. DISCUSS [191] is an incentive-
based data forwarding protocol based on evolutionary theory
in which encountered nodes share their message forwarding
history with each other that can help them to choose the
best routing strategy dynamically. In DISCUSS, three types
of nodes are considered: cooperators that relay messages for
others altruistically; exploiters that use the capability of other
nodes in data forwarding but do not relay their messages;
and isolators that neither help nor get help. Thus, a node in
DISCUSS selects the cooperators as the next message carriers
as well as motives the exploiters and isolators to reveal their
routing strategies and cooperate in message relaying.
Some recent incentive-based mobile data offloading mech-
anisms aim at encouraging mobile nodes to relay a portion
of the cellular traffic through DTNs and Wi-Fi hotspots [29].
Zhou et al. [192] propose a reverse auction-based incentive
approach, namely Win-Coupon, in which nodes with high
delay tolerance and large offloading potentials have the highest
priority to offload the cellular traffic. In Win-Coupon, auction-
winning users receive data with delay and earn a coupon,
whereas other nodes download data from the cellular network
directly. In particular, a semi-Markov model is designed to
Fig. 9. A general illustration of contract-based incentive design.
predict the nodes’ delay tolerance potentials based on their
mobility patterns. Similarly, Li et al. [193] employ contract
theory to model delayed data offloading between an operator
and mobile nodes in which each mobile node chooses a proper
contract based on its preferences. The main objective is to
maximize the operator’s profit while guaranteeing the feasi-
bility of the nodes. The authors in [194] propose an energy-
aware mobile data offloading algorithm, which combines duty
cycling and selfishness energy saving mechanisms to promote
the cooperation of mobile nodes. The experiments reveal that
the proposed scheme achieves up to 85% energy savings
while losing about 1% in system throughput when nodes fully
cooperate in data distribution. In addition, it shows that the
proposed scheme is robust against non-cooperative nodes even
when 50% of the nodes do not follow the underlying data
offloading protocol.
A number of miscellaneous incentive approaches have
been proposed in D2D communication. The authors in
[31][195][196] introduce the application of contract theory to
model the interaction between content provider(s) and nodes
where the main objective is to maximize the utility of the oper-
ator provided that the expected utility of nodes is also satisfied
when signing the contract. In comparison to other incentive
approaches (e.g., auction games), contract-based methods can
reduce nodes’ computational and communication cost because
the operator does not need to collect the nodes’ feedback after
each auction announcement. Instead, the operator provides
different contracts and their corresponding rewards for nodes
with different features, and the nodes can select a more
beneficial contract with maximum benefits (Fig. 9).
Some incentive schemes for D2D communications group
nodes into communities based on their social relationships or
contact history and explore their incentives for inter and intra-
group cooperations. Zhao et al. [50] propose a three-phase
approach for data dissemination in which nodes are grouped
into communities based on their betweenness centrality. Next,
seed nodes in each community are identified according to
their closeness centrality. Finally, they disseminate messages
received from the BS to their socially-connected nodes in their
community where the nodes in each community have an incen-
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TABLE VI
SUMMARY OF THE SECURITY-BASED AND MISCELLANEOUS CREDIT MECHANISMS
M
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Reference Principle of proposed solutions Incentive objective Specialties (+) and limitations (-)
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Zhu et al.
[182]
A multi-layer credit scheme based
on layered coin
Dividing the total credit among the
cooperative nodes based on a
profit-sharing model
+ Detects the edge insertion and removal
attacks
Lu et al. [183]
A hybrid (credit and reputation)
incentive that provides fairness
Maximizing the credit of nodes
that deliver messages
+ Thwarts edge insertion and removal attacks
- Considers the single-copy routing only
Chen et al.
[184]
An incentive-compatible scheme for
the nodes that have a finite budget
Rewarding the nodes in the earliest
delivery path based on the concept
of contribution time
+ Detects the edge insertion, removal, and
manipulation attacks
- No evaluation of the communication cost
Zhou and Cao
[185]
A threshold incentive mechanism
based on a modified population
dynamic model
Rewarding the nodes for data
relaying and security
considerations
+ Considers fairness by providing equal
relaying opportunities to each node
- No evaluation of the communication cost
Wang et al.
[186]
A multi-receiver charging and
rewarding scheme for data
dissemination
Replicating messages to nodes that
have already delivered previous
messages successfully
+ Detects the edge insertion attacks
- Cannot detect colluding attacks
M
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Guan et al.
[187]
A taxation strategy to avoid the
existence of poverty nodes caused by
socially selfish behavior
Provides credit for socially
isolated nodes to afford buy the
forwarding services of other nodes
+ Introduces a new form of internal threats
- Lack of analytical evaluations
Mei and Stefa
[188]
One of the first selfish-resilient
social-aware data forwarding
protocols
Pushing messages far from a local
community swiftly with a
minimum number of replications
+ The routing strategies are Nash equilibria
Cannot detect colluding selfish nodes
Ning et al.
[189]
A community-based incentive
scheme to stimulate both IS and SS
nodes in data relaying
Maximizing the individual and the
social utility of nodes
+ Applies different types of credit for nodes
with different routing preferences
- Lack of analytical evaluations
Seregina et al.
[190]
A credit scheme to promote the
cooperation of nodes in Two-hop
relaying
Minimizing the amount of prices
to be paid for delivering messages
+ Every relay node is proposed a different
reward based on its contact probability
- Rewarding is unfair because only the first
deliverer is rewarded
Misra et al.
[191]
A rewarding scheme in which nodes
adapt their forwarding strategy based
on message delivery information
Maximizing the delivery
probability of messages by
motivating selfish nodes to
cooperation
+ Presenting both analytical and
simulation-based experiments
- No consideration of the nodes’ social
preferences
Zhuo et al.
[192]
An auction-based incentive
mechanism that leverages nodes’
delay tolerance for traffic offloading
Minimizing the incentive cost
given an offloading target
+ Considers the dynamic features of nodes’
delay tolerance
- Nodes’ social features are not considered
Li et al. [193]
A contract-based incentive
mechanism for data offloading with
respect to nodes’ satisfaction factors
Maximizing the operator’s profit
for both continuous and discrete
user-type models
+ The operator can make decision based on
nodes’ statistical information
- Node mobility is not considered
Kouyoumdjieva
and Karlsson
[194]
An adaptable and scalable mobile
data offloading protocol under full
and limited node cooperation
Maximizing the network
throughput while saving the nodes’
energy
+ exploits the energy consumption of nodes
that participate in the offloading process
- Does not conduct analytical experiments
Zhang et al.
[195]
A contract-based mechanism to
overcome the information asymmetry
problem in D2D content sharing
Optimizing the network capacity
while guaranteeing the network
QoS requirements
+ A flexible rewarding method based on the
nodes’ preferences
Chen et al.
[196]
A general framework for designing
optimal contracts between the
operator and D2D nodes
Maximize the profit of service
provider and nodes according to
their valuations
+ The operator does not require gathering
information from nodes frequently
- Less communication and computational
costs
Zhao et al.
[50]
A social and contact-based incentive
scheme for community-based D2D
data sharing
Maximizing the utility of nodes
and their social friends with
respect to their restricted resources
+ Selfish nodes are stimulated to truthfully
report their data forwarding preferences
Pan et al. [197]
A social-based incentive scheme for
community-based D2D data
offloading
Maximizing the data offloading
gain considering the nodes’
content and social preferences
+ Complimenting simulations with analytical
results
Wu et al. [56]
A social-aware rate-based D2D data
sharing scheme, which is modeled as
a maximum weighted mixed
matching problem
Maximizing the individual utility
of nodes
+ Considers a novel multi-hop D2D
communication paradigm
- Resource representations and scheduling
techniques are not considered
tive to mutually benefit from exchanging messages with each
other in a multi-hop D2D communication mode. Similarly, Pan
et al. [197] propose a content pushing mechanism in which
nodes are grouped based on their content preferences where a
node replicates contents for inter-group and intra-group nodes
with different probabilities. The experiments demonstrate that
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the offloading performance heavily relies on the cooperation
level of nodes. Wu et al. [56] propose a joint social-aware and
link quality-based content sharing mode selection protocol in
the presence of cooperative and SS nodes. It is assumed that
there exist three communication models: BS-to-D2D, D2D,
and multi-hop D2D. Thus, the content sharing mode selection
problem is modeled as a maximum mixed matching problem.
Summary: Table VI summarizes the main characteristics
of the security-based and miscellaneous credit mechanisms. It
can be seen that the majority of the security-based rewarding
schemes use the layered coin technique to protect granting
rewards to cooperative nodes and protect the rewarding system
against malicious attacks. In addition, almost all the security-
based credit schemes focus on DTNs, while the security of
credit distribution in D2D communications is not studied in the
existing works. Furthermore, the miscellaneous credit mecha-
nisms employ concepts, such as taxation, contract theory, and
social community to design their incentive mechanisms.
VI. OPEN DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In previous sections, we have reviewed the state-of-the-art
of data routing and dissemination services and protocols in
the non-cooperative WRNs and highlighted their specialties
and limitations. In light of the works focusing on various
aspects of the non-cooperative WRNs, there are still several
open problems and challenges, which are left without proper
answers. In this section, we discuss possible future research
directions that can bring new visions into the horizon of
WRNs.
A. Realistic Human Altruism and Selfishness Models
So far, we introduced different types of human selfish
behaviors and actions in WRNs (e.g., [59], [84]). Although
IS and SS nodes have been introduced as general selfishness
models, several other important factors (such as available
resources, content knowledge, and spatiotemporal information)
should be further explored to realistically model the selfish
behavior of mobile nodes in WRNs. For example, it is chal-
lenging how the selfish behavior of mobile nodes evolves in
different situations and locations based on their social and
contextual properties. In addition, it is non-trivial to explore
how the selfish behavior of nodes changes when different
levels of battery or power resources remain in their devices
(or when their devices are charging). Modeling human selfish
behaviors in D2D communication with respect to its unique
characteristics is another challenging issue that received less
attention from the research community. For example, it is not
explored how much selfish D2D nodes have the freedom to
limit sharing their spectrum resources with other nodes. More-
over, how their social tie information and relationships affect
their cooperation levels in content sharing and distribution.
B. Impact Analysis of Human Non-cooperative Behaviors on
Data Forwarding and Content Sharing
Although the impact of mobile nodes’ non-cooperative be-
haviors on the performance of data delivery protocols in DTNs
has been studied from different perspectives (see Section
III), several avenues for further research are still open. The
existing analytical models have generally explored the effects
of nodes’ selfish behavior on only the data delivery delay
and transmission cost metrics (see Table I). One future trend
is extending the existing analytical frameworks to a generic
model (e.g., a multi-dimensional CTMC model) to analyze
the performance depredation of other system parameters (such
as the data delivery ratio and energy) and compare their
tradeoffs. In addition, exploring the impact of nodes’ sophis-
ticated selfish behavior on the overall performance of data
delivery raises new research problems. For example, it is non-
trivial to explore how nodes’ social ties, physical locations, or
contextual information affect their cooperation level and the
performance of data delivery protocols under different settings
(e.g., when the network traffic varies from medium to high).
The impact of mobile nodes’ selfish behavior on the overall
D2D network performance is another interesting research chal-
lenge that received less attention by the research community.
Although a limited number of simulation-based experiments
(e.g., [87][89]) have studied human selfish behaviors in D2D
communications underlying cellular networks, there is no an-
alytical approach to explore the effects’ of node selfishness on
network throughput accurately. For example, a CTMC model
can be designed to model data dissemination in community-
based D2D communications and analyze how the network per-
formance metrics are degraded in the presence of D2D selfish
mobile nodes. Additionally, specific communication protocols
and policies (e.g., opportunistic scheduling algorithms) should
be developed to determine human cooperation models and
control the system parameters against changes made by D2D
selfish mobile nodes.
C. Robust Mechanisms to Detect Non-cooperative Nodes
Although different mechanisms are proposed to detect self-
ish and malicious mobile nodes in WRNs (see Section IV),
they might be ineffective and inefficient in case the number
of malicious nodes is high or sophisticated denial-of-service
attacks are launched by them. The main reason is that mobile
nodes often do not have up-to-date information about the
network’s global state (i.e., the contact and social graphs),
especially in highly dynamic WRNs. One promising solution
to effectively detect non-cooperative nodes is establishing trust
relationships among nodes based on their social similarities
or analyzing their data forwarding behaviors based on their
social preferences (e.g., see [198]). This idea sounds very
useful because the social features of nodes are relatively
stable over time. Another possible solution is developing a
learning system based on nodes’ contact history or social
relations to discover the patterns of common selfishness and
attack models. In such a system, mobile nodes can upload
their contact and social properties to a server and the server
runs complicated operations to learn the nodes’ behavior and
find their selfishness and attack patterns. Detecting colluding
attackers in WRNs is another challenging problem, which
is addressed by a few numbers of recent studies (e.g., in
[118]). While the majority of the existing detection methods
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investigate nodes’ contact history to discover inconsistent or
manipulated records, exploring the contact graph (instead of
contact history) can help detect colluding attackers swiftly and
accurately.
Establishing secure and reliable data sharing and dissemi-
nation protocols in D2D communications by selecting honest
and trustworthy intermediate nodes and isolating selfish and
malicious nodes is a greatly challenging problem. For example,
it is non-trivial to explore how to detect D2D selfish nodes
in heterogeneous and large-scale networks when they use
unlicensed bands to share their messages. One promising
solution could be to design distributed and decentralized secu-
rity and trustworthy mechanisms in which novel technologies
(such as blockchain) are employed to store and exchange
nodes’ security information and control their cooperation and
trustworthiness. Another exciting research direction is to detect
malicious nodes and their attack models in D2D communica-
tions, which is not explored in the literature.
D. Effective and Fair Incentive Mechanisms
Different incentive mechanisms have been proposed to stim-
ulate the cooperation of selfish nodes in WRNs (see Section
V). Overall, it can be seen that effectiveness and fairness are
two important factors that should be considered in designing
an incentive mechanism. In other words, an incentive scheme
should not only appropriately encourage selfish nodes to help
relay messages on behalf of other nodes but also reward the
nodes according to their cooperation level fairly and protect the
rewarding system against malicious attacks and unfair manip-
ulations. One major challenge in providing effective incentives
is to devise various forms of incentives (e.g., monetary, social
relevance, or non-monetary) to stimulate the cooperation of
nodes with different selfish behaviors and preferences. For
example, empirical experiments in [84] reveal that minor credit
(e.g., one dollar) can change the altruistic behavior of mobile
users with limited device resources significantly. In addition,
taking into account the properties of contents (e.g., their size)
and the actual capabilities of nodes for data distribution (e.g.,
the energy level of their devices) can help design effective
incentive mechanisms.
Another challenging future research direction is developing
effective incentive strategies in D2D-enabled heterogeneous
networks that can ultimately raise cooperation among wireless
D2D nodes, spectrum owners, and service providers. Due to
the bandwidth limitations of the backhaul network and base
stations in the heterogeneous networks, encouraging resource-
limited D2D devices to cache contents for others and share
their spectrum resources with them is extremely challenging,
especially for data-intensive applications with massive users.
To effectively stimulate D2D devices to cooperate with the
other network entities in data delivery, different criteria, such
as resource availability and user interests in content should
be considered. For example, different cost and rewarding
mechanisms can be considered for users with different pref-
erences. One promising solution is applying cooperative and
non-cooperative game-theoretic approaches to analyze multi-
stage interactions between the base station and D2D devices
with heterogeneous resources, reveal their true preferences,
and maximize their utilities.
Developing secure and privacy-preserving incentive mech-
anisms in the presence of malicious and cheating nodes
are other important research challenges that need further
explorations. For instance, how to design secure incentive
mechanisms that enforce the required fairness in assigning
rewards to cooperative nodes is still an open problem. Besides,
it remains an important issue how to stimulate mobile nodes to
cooperate in data delivery, consume their computational, and
bandwidth resources while preserving their privacy.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an in-depth literature review
of recent studies on human-centric communications in non-
cooperative WRNs. Specifically, we introduced different self-
ish behavior and malicious attacks that can be launched by
misbehaving nodes in cooperative data delivery. Meanwhile,
we studied the impacts of nodes’ different non-cooperative
actions on the performance of data delivery protocols. In addi-
tion, we discussed distributed detect and defense mechanisms
that attempt to identify selfish and malicious nodes in WRNs.
Furthermore, we explored a large number of incentive mech-
anisms and discussed their major characteristics. Finally, we
discussed several open issues and future research directions.
Since efficient and secure communications are simultaneously
becoming ever-important in next-generationwireless networks,
we hope that this survey will be useful for the network protocol
and mobile application developers and encourage them to
design appealing data delivery mechanisms.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work is partially supported by the National Natural
Science Foundation of China (61572106 and 61502075). The
authors are grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their
constructive comments and suggestions to improve the quality
of the article.
REFERENCES
[1] “Cisco visual networking index: Global mobile data traffic
forecast update,,” 2016-2021 White Paper, [Online]. Available:
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-
provider/visual-networking-index-vni/mobile-white-paper-c11-
520862.html.
[2] K. Fall, “A delay-tolerant network architecture for challenged inter-
nets,” in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, 2003, pp. 27–34.
[3] T. S. Athanasios V. Vasilakos, Yan Zhang, Delay Tolerant Networks:
Protocols and Applications. CRC Press, 2011.
[4] A. Asadi, Q. Wang, and V. Mancuso, “A survey on Device-to-Device
communication in cellular networks,” IEEE Communications Surveys
Tutorials, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 1801–1819, 2014.
[5] X. Hu, T. H. S. Chu, V. C. M. Leung, E. C. H. Ngai, P. Kruchten, and
H. C. B. Chan, “A survey on mobile social networks: Applications,
platforms, system architectures, and future research directions,” IEEE
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1557–1581,
2015.
[6] V. Sciancalepore, D. Giustiniano, A. Banchs, and A. Hossmann-
Picu, “Offloading cellular traffic through opportunistic communica-
tions: Analysis and optimization,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 122–137, 2016.
[7] K. W. Choi and Z. Han, “Device-to-device discovery for proximity-
based service in LTE-advanced system,” IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 55–66, 2015.
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, 2018 27
[8] S. Y. Lien, C. C. Chien, G. S. T. Liu, H. L. Tsai, R. Li, and Y. J.
Wang, “Enhanced LTE Device-to-Device proximity services,” IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 54, no. 12, pp. 174–182, 2016.
[9] Y. Zeng, K. Xiang, D. Li, and A. V. Vasilakos, “Directional routing
and scheduling for green vehicular delay tolerant networks,” Wireless
Networks, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 161–173, 2013.
[10] Z. Ning, F. Xia, N. Ullah, X. Kong, and X. Hu, “Vehicular social
networks: Enabling smart mobility,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
vol. 55, no. 5, pp. 49–55, 2017.
[11] N. Kayastha, D. Niyato, P. Wang, and E. Hossain, “Applications,
architectures, and protocol design issues for mobile social networks:
A survey,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 99, no. 12, pp. 2130–2158,
2011.
[12] Z. Mao, Y. Jiang, G. Min, S. Leng, X. Jin, and K. Yang, “Mobile
social networks: Design requirements, architecture, and state-of-the-art
technology,” Computer Communications, vol. 100, pp. 1–19, 2017.
[13] N. Vastardis and K. Yang, “Mobile social networks: Architectures,
social properties, and key research challenges,” IEEE Communications
Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 1355–1371, 2013.
[14] Y. Wang, A. V. Vasilakos, Q. Jin, and J. Ma, “Survey on mobile
social networking in proximity (MSNP): approaches, challenges and
architecture,” Wireless Networks, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 1295–1311, 2014.
[15] K. Wei, X. Liang, and K. Xu, “A survey of social-aware routing
protocols in delay tolerant networks: Applications, taxonomy and
design-related issues,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 556–578, 2014.
[16] K. Zhu, W. Li, X. Fu, and L. Zhang, “Data routing strategies in
opportunistic mobile social networks: Taxonomy and open challenges,”
Computer Networks, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 183 – 198, 2015.
[17] N. Chakchouk, “A survey on opportunistic routing in wireless com-
munication networks,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 2214–2241, 2015.
[18] T. Spyropoulos, R. N. B. Rais, T. Turletti, K. Obraczka, and A. Vasi-
lakos, “Routing for disruption tolerant networks: taxonomy and de-
sign,” Wireless Networks, vol. 16, no. 8, pp. 2349–2370, 2010.
[19] I. Woungang, S. K. Dhurandher, A. Anpalagan, and A. V. Vasilakos,
Routing in Opportunistic Networks. Springer Publishing Company,
Incorporated, 2013.
[20] M. Youssef, M. Ibrahim, M. Abdelatif, L. Chen, and A. V. Vasilakos,
“Routing metrics of cognitive radio networks: A survey,” IEEE Com-
munications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 92–109, 2014.
[21] T. Abdelkader, K. Naik, A. Nayak, N. Goel, and V. Srivastava, “A
performance comparison of delay-tolerant network routing protocols,”
IEEE Network, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 46–53, 2016.
[22] Y. Zhu, B. Xu, X. Shi, and Y. Wang, “A survey of social-based routing
in delay tolerant networks: Positive and negative social effects,” IEEE
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 387–401,
2013.
[23] S. Batabyal and P. Bhaumik, “Mobility models, traces and impact
of mobility on opportunistic routing algorithms: A survey,” IEEE
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1679–1707,
2015.
[24] P. Pirozmand, G. Wu, B. Jedari, and F. Xia, “Human mobility in op-
portunistic networks: Characteristics, models and prediction methods,”
Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 42, pp. 45–58,
2014.
[25] L. Jin, Y. Chen, T. Wang, P. Hui, and A. V. Vasilakos, “Understanding
user behavior in online social networks: a survey,” IEEE Communica-
tions Magazine, vol. 51, no. 9, pp. 144–150, 2013.
[26] Y. Q. Zhang, X. Li, J. Xu, and A. V. Vasilakos, “Human interactive
patterns in temporal networks,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man,
and Cybernetics: Systems, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 214–222, 2015.
[27] Y. Li, M. Qian, D. Jin, P. Hui, and A. V. Vasilakos, “Revealing
the efficiency of information diffusion in online social networks of
microblog,” Information Sciences, vol. 293, pp. 383–389, 2015.
[28] B. M. C. Silva, J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, N. Kumar, and G. Han,
“Cooperative strategies for challenged networks and applications: A
survey,” IEEE Systems Journal, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 2749–2760, 2017.
[29] Y. He, M. Chen, B. Ge, and M. Guizani, “On WiFi offloading in
heterogeneous networks: Various incentives and trade-off strategies,”
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 2345–
2385, 2016.
[30] G. Iosifidis, L. Gao, J. Huang, and L. Tassiulas, “Social-oriented
adaptive transmission in opportunistic internet of smartphones,” IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 52, no. 9, pp. 20–27, 2014.
[31] Y. Zhang, M. Pan, L. Song, Z. Dawy, and Z. Han, “A survey of contract
theory-based incentive mechanism design in wireless networks,” IEEE
Wireless Communications, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 80–85, 2017.
[32] A. M. Ahmed, T. Qiu, F. Xia, B. Jedari, and S. Abolfazli, “Event-based
mobile social networks: Services, technologies, and applications,” IEEE
Access, vol. 2, 2014.
[33] Y. Wang, L. Wei, A. V. Vasilakos, and Q. Jin, “Device-to-device
based mobile social networking in proximity (MSNP) on smartphones:
Framework, challenges and prototype,” Future Generation Computer
Systems, vol. 74, pp. 241 – 253, 2017.
[34] Y. Zhao and W. Song, “Survey on social-aware data dissemination over
mobile wireless networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 6049–6059, 2017.
[35] P. Gandotra, R. K. Jha, and S. Jain, “A survey on device-to-device
(D2D) communication: Architecture and security issues,” Journal of
Network and Computer Applications, vol. 78, pp. 9–29, 2017.
[36] E. Ahmed, I. Yaqoob, A. Gani, M. Imran, , and M. Guizani, “Social-
aware resource allocation and optimization for D2D communication,”
IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 122–129, 2017.
[37] Y. Najaflou, B. Jedari, F. Xia, L. T. Yang, and M. S. Obaidat, “Safety
challenges and solutions in mobile social networks,” IEEE Systems
Journal, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 834–854, 2015.
[38] X. Liang, K. Zhang, X. Shen, and X. Lin, “Security and privacy
in mobile social networks: challenges and solutions,” IEEE Wireless
Communications, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 33–41, 2014.
[39] K. Zhang, X. Liang, R. Lu, and X. Shen, “Sybil attacks and their
defenses in the internet of things,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal,
vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 372–383, 2014.
[40] M. Haus, M. Waqas, A. Y. Ding, Y. Li, S. Tarkoma, and J. Ott,
“Security and privacy in device-to-device (D2D) communication: A
review,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 19, no. 2,
pp. 1054–1079, 2017.
[41] J. S. Lee, Y. W. Su, and C. C. Shen, “A comparative study of wireless
protocols: Bluetooth, UWB, ZigBee, and Wi-Fi,” in Proc. 33rd Annual
Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society, 2007, pp. 46–
51.
[42] F. Xia, L. Liu, J. Li, J. Ma, and A. V. Vasilakos, “Socially aware
networking: A survey,” IEEE Systems Journal, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 904–
921, 2015.
[43] F. Xia, A. M. Ahmed, L. T. Yang, J. Ma, and J. J. Rodrigues, “Ex-
ploiting social relationship to enable efficient replica allocation in ad-
hoc social networks,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems, vol. 25, no. 12, pp. 3167–3176, 2014.
[44] F. Xia, L. Liu, J. Li, A. M. Ahmed, L. T. Yang, and J. Ma, “Beeinfo:
Interest-based forwarding using artificial bee colony for socially-aware
networking,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,
vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 1188–1200, 2015.
[45] J. Li, Z. Ning, B. Jedari, F. Xia, I. Lee, and A. Tolba, “Geo-social
distance-based data dissemination for socially aware networking,” IEEE
Access, vol. 4, pp. 1444–1453, 2016.
[46] Z. Ning, F. Xia, X. Hu, Z. Chen, and M. S. Obaidat, “Social-oriented
adaptive transmission in opportunistic internet of smartphones,” IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 810–820,
2017.
[47] Y. Meng, C. Jiang, H. H. Chen, and Y. Ren, “Cooperative device-to-
device communications: Social networking perspectives,” IEEE Net-
work, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 38–44, 2017.
[48] Y. Li, T. Wu, P. Hui, D. Jin, and S. Chen, “Social-aware D2D
communications: qualitative insights and quantitative analysis,” IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 150–158, 2014.
[49] Y. Zhang, E. Pan, L. Song, W. Saad, Z. Dawy, and Z. Han, “Social
network aware device-to-device communication in wireless networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 14, no. 1, pp.
177–190, 2015.
[50] Y. Zhao, W. Song, and Z. Han, “Social-aware data dissemination via
device-to-device communications: Fusing social and mobile networks
with incentive constraints,” IEEE Transactions on Services Computing,
2016.
[51] B. Zhang, Y. Li, D. Jin, P. Hui, and Z. Han, “Social-aware peer
discovery for D2D communications underlaying cellular networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 14, no. 5, pp.
2426–2439, 2015.
[52] Y. Zhao, Y. Li, Y. Cao, T. Jiang, and N. Ge, “Social-aware resource
allocation for device-to-device communications underlaying cellular
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 14,
no. 12, pp. 6621–6634, 2015.
[53] L. Militano, A. Orsino, G. Araniti, M. Nitti, L. Atzori, and A. Iera,
“Trust-based and social-aware coalition formation game for multihop
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, 2018 28
data uploading in 5G systems,” Computer Networks, vol. 111, pp. 141–
151, 2016.
[54] A. Ometov, A. Orsino, L. Militano, G. Araniti, D. Moltchanov, and
S. Andreev, “A novel security-centric framework for D2D connectivity
based on spatial and social proximity,” Computer Networks, vol. 107,
pp. 327–338, 2016.
[55] R. Wang, K. Liu, D. Wu, H. Wang, and J. Yan, “Malicious-behavior-
aware D2D link selection mechanism,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 15 162–
15 173, 2017.
[56] D. Wu, L. Zhou, and Y. Cai, “Social-aware rate based content sharing
mode selection for D2D content sharing scenarios,” IEEE Transactions
on Multimedia, 2017.
[57] M. Wang and Z. Yan, “A survey on security in D2D communications,”
Mobile Networks and Applications, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 195–208, 2017.
[58] Y. Cao, T. Jiang, and C. Wang, “Cooperative device-to-device com-
munications in cellular networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications,
vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 124–129, 2015.
[59] P. Hui, K. Xu, V. O. K. Li, J. Crowcroft, V. Latora, and P. Lio, “Self-
ishness, altruism and message spreading in mobile social networks,” in
Proc. IEEE INFOCOM Workshops 2009, 2009, pp. 1–6.
[60] A. Keranen, M. Pitkanen, M. Vuori, and J. Ott, “Effect of non-
cooperative nodes in mobile DTNs,” in Proc. IEEE WoWMoM, 2011,
pp. 1–7.
[61] A. Panagakis, A. Vaios, and l. Stavrakakis, “On the effects of cooper-
ation in DTNs,” in Proc. 2nd International Conference on Communi-
cation Systems Software and Middleware, 2007, pp. 1–6.
[62] S. T. Kouyoumdjieva and G. Karlsson, “The virtue of selfishness:
Device perspective on mobile data offloading,” in Proc. IEEE Wire-
less Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), 2015, pp.
2067–2072.
[63] Y. K. Ip, W. C. Lau, and O. C. Yue, “Performance modeling of epidemic
routing with heterogeneous node types,” in Proc. IEEE International
Conference on Communications, 2008, pp. 219–224.
[64] Q. Li, W. Gao, S. Zhu, and G. Cao, “A routing protocol for socially
selfish delay tolerant networks,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 10, no. 8, pp.
1619–1632, 2012.
[65] E. Jaho, M. Karaliopoulos, and I. Stavrakakis, “Social similarity
favors cooperation: The distributed content replication case,” IEEE
Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 24, no. 3, pp.
601–613, 2013.
[66] J. H. Cho, A. Swami, and I. R. Chen, “A survey on trust manage-
ment for mobile ad hoc networks,” IEEE Communications Surveys &
Tutorials, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 562–583, 2011.
[67] A. Ometov, A. Orsino, L. Militano, D. Moltchanov, G. Araniti,
E. Olshannikova, G. Fodor, S. Andreev, T. Olsson, A. Iera, J. Torsner,
Y. Koucheryavy, and T. Mikkonen, “Toward trusted, social-aware D2D
connectivity: bridging across the technology and sociality realms,”
IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 103–111, 2016.
[68] L. Yao, Y. Man, Z. Huang, J. Deng, and X. Wang, “Secure routing
based on social similarity in opportunistic networks,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Wireless Communications, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 594–605, 2016.
[69] I. R. Chen, F. Bao, and J. Guo, “Trust-based service management for
social internet of things systems,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable
and Secure Computing, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 684–696, 2016.
[70] K. Zhang, X. Liang, R. Lu, and X. Shen, “Sybil attacks and their
defenses in the internet of things,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal,
vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 372–383, 2014.
[71] A. Vahdat and D. Becker, “Epidemic routing for partially connected ad
hoc networks,” Technical Report CS-200006, Duke University, 2000.
[72] M. Grossglauser and D. N. C. Tse, “Mobility increases the capacity
of ad hoc wireless networks,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 477–486, 2002.
[73] T. Spyropoulos, K. Psounis, and C. S. Raghavendra, “Spray and
wait: An efficient routing scheme for intermittently connected mobile
networks,” in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, 2005, pp. 252–259.
[74] A. Dvir and A. V. Vasilakos, “Backpressure-based routing protocol for
dtns,” SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 405–406,
2010.
[75] A. Lindgren, A. Doria, and O. Schele´n, “Probabilistic routing in
intermittently connected networks,” ACM SIGMOBILE Computing and
Communications Review, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 19–20, 2003.
[76] P. Hui, J. Crowcroft, and E. Yoneki, “BUBBLE Rap: Social-based
forwarding in delay-tolerant networks,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile
Computing, vol. 10, no. 11, pp. 1576–1589, 2011.
[77] W. Moreira, P. Mendes, and S. Sargento, “Opportunistic routing based
on daily routines,” in Proc. IEEE WoWMoM, 2012, pp. 1–6.
[78] F. Xia, L. Liu, B. Jedari, and S. K. Das, “PIS: A multi-dimensional
routing protocol for socially-aware networking,” IEEE Transactions on
Mobile Computing, vol. 15, no. 11, pp. 2825–2836, 2016.
[79] Y. Li, P. Hui, D. Jin, L. Su, and L. Zeng, “Evaluating the impact of
social selfishness on the epidemic routing in delay tolerant networks,”
IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 14, no. 11, pp. 1026–1028, 2010.
[80] M. Karaliopoulos, “Assessing the vulnerability of DTN data relaying
schemes to node selfishness,” IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 13,
no. 12, pp. 923–925, 2009.
[81] Y. Li, G. Su, and Z. Wang, “Evaluating the effects of node cooperation
on DTN routing,” International Journal of Electronics and Communi-
cations, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 62 – 67, 2012.
[82] G. Resta and P. Santi, “A framework for routing performance anal-
ysis in delay tolerant networks with application to noncooperative
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems,
vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 2–10, 2012.
[83] X. Xiao, Y. Li, X. Kui, and A. V. Vasilakos, “Assessing the influence
of selfishness on the system performance of gossip based vehicular
networks,” Wireless Networks, vol. 20, no. 7, pp. 1795–1805, 2014.
[84] C. Bermejo, R. Zheng, and P. Hui, “An empirical study of human al-
truistic behaviors in opportunistic networks,” in Proc. 7th International
Workshop on Hot Topics in Planet-scale mObile Computing and Online
Social neTworking, 2015, pp. 43–48.
[85] F. Xia, B. Jedari, L. T. Yang, J. Ma, and R. Huang, “A signaling game
for uncertain data delivery in selfish mobile social networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Computational Social Systems, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 100–
112, 2016.
[86] Y. Wang, A. V. Vasilakos, J. Ma, and N. Xiong, “On studying the
impact of uncertainty on behavior diffusion in social networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems, vol. 45,
no. 2, pp. 185–197, 2015.
[87] T. Wang, Y. Sun, L. Song, and Z. Han, “Social data offloading in
D2D-enhanced cellular networks by network formation games,” IEEE
Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 14, no. 12, pp. 7004–
7015, 2015.
[88] F. Wang, Z. Wang, and Z. Yang, “Evaluating the influence of social
selfishness on cooperative D2D communications,” in Proc. 7th Inter-
national Workshop on Hot Topics in Planet-scale mObile Computing
and Online Social neTworking, ser. HOTPOST ’15, 2015, pp. 49–54.
[89] C. Gao, H. Zhang, X. Chen, Y. Li, D. Jin, and S. Chen, “Impact
of selfishness in device-to-device communication underlaying cellular
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 66, no. 10,
pp. 9338–9349, 2017.
[90] Y. Li, G. Su, D. O. Wu, D. Jin, L. Su, and L. Zeng, “The impact
of node selfishness on multicasting in delay tolerant networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 60, no. 5, pp. 2224–2238,
2011.
[91] Y. Wu, S. Deng, and H. Huang, “On modeling the impact of selfish
behaviors on limited epidemic routing in delay tolerant networks,”
Wireless Personal Communications, vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 2759–2782,
2013.
[92] P. Sermpezis and T. Spyropoulos, “Understanding the effects of social
selfishness on the performance of heterogeneous opportunistic net-
works,” Computer Communications, vol. 48, no. 0, pp. 71–83, 2014.
[93] ——, “Delay analysis of epidemic schemes in sparse and dense hetero-
geneous contact networks,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,
vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 2464–2477, 2017.
[94] A. Asadi and V. Mancuso, “A survey on opportunistic scheduling in
wireless communications,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials,
vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 1671–1688, 2013.
[95] K. Liu, J. Deng, P. K. Varshney, and K. Balakrishnan, “An
acknowledgment-based approach for the detection of routing misbe-
havior in MANETs,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 6,
no. 5, pp. 536–550, 2007.
[96] M. N. Mejri and J. Ben-Othman, “Detecting greedy behavior by linear
regression and watchdog in vehicular ad hoc networks,” in Proc. IEEE
Global Communications Conference, 2014, pp. 5032–5037.
[97] E. Herna´ndez-Orallo, M. D. Serrat Olmos, J.-C. Cano, C. T. Calafate,
and P. Manzoni, “Evaluation of collaborative selfish node detection in
MANETs and DTNs,” in Proc. 15th ACM International Conference on
Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Wireless and Mobile Systems,
ser. MSWiM ’12, 2012, pp. 159–166.
[98] E. Hernndez-Orallo, M. D. S. Olmos, J. C. Cano, C. T. Calafate,
and P. Manzoni, “CoCoWa: A collaborative contact-based watchdog
for detecting selfish nodes,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,
vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 1162–1175, 2015.
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, 2018 29
[99] E. Ayday and F. Fekri, “An iterative algorithm for trust management and
adversary detection for delay-tolerant networks,” IEEE Transactions on
Mobile Computing, vol. 11, no. 9, pp. 1514–1531, 2012.
[100] J. A. F. F. Dias, J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, F. Xia, and C. X. Mavromous-
takis, “A cooperative watchdog system to detect misbehavior nodes
in vehicular delay-tolerant networks,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial
Electronics, vol. 62, no. 12, pp. 7929–7937, 2015.
[101] H. Zhu, S. Du, Z. Gao, M. Dong, and Z. Cao, “A probabilistic misbe-
havior detection scheme toward efficient trust establishment in delay-
tolerant networks,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 22–32, 2014.
[102] S. Trifunovic, F. Legendre, and C. Anastasiades, “Social trust in
opportunistic networks,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2010, pp. 1–6.
[103] M. Nitti, R. Girau, and L. Atzori, “Trustworthiness management in the
social internet of things,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 1253–1266, 2014.
[104] G. Bigwood and T. Henderson, “IRONMAN: Using social networks
to add incentives and reputation to opportunistic networks,” in Proc.
IEEE Third International Conference on Social Computing, 2011, pp.
65–72.
[105] R.-I. Ciobanu, C. Dobre, M. Dascalu, S. Trausan-Matu, and V. Cristea,
“SENSE: A collaborative selfish node detection and incentive mecha-
nism for opportunistic networks,” Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, vol. 41, pp. 240–249, 2014.
[106] I. R. Chen, F. Bao, M. Chang, and J. H. Cho, “Dynamic trust manage-
ment for delay tolerant networks and its application to secure routing,”
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 25, no. 5,
pp. 1200–1210, 2014.
[107] X. Chen, B. Proulx, X. Gong, and J. Zhang, “Exploiting social ties for
cooperative D2D communications: A mobile social networking case,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 1471–1484,
2015.
[108] L. Militano, A. Orsino, G. Araniti, M. Nitti, L. Atzori, and A. Iera,
“Trusted D2D-based data uploading in in-band narrowband-IoT with
social awareness,” in Proc. IEEE 27th Annual International Symposium
on Personal, Indoor, and Mobile Radio Communications (PIMRC),
2016, pp. 1–6.
[109] M. Zhang, X. Chen, and J. Zhang, “Social-aware relay selection for
cooperative networking: An optimal stopping approach,” in Proc. IEEE
International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2014, pp. 2257–
2262.
[110] J. Yan, D. Wu, S. Sanyal, and R. Wang, “Trust-oriented partner
selection in D2D cooperative communications,” IEEE Access, vol. 5,
pp. 3444–3453, 2017.
[111] Y. Cao, T. Jiang, X. Chen, and J. Zhang, “Social-aware video multicast
based on device-to-device communications,” IEEE Transactions on
Mobile Computing, vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 1528–1539, 2016.
[112] K. Liu, J. Deng, P. K. Varshney, and K. Balakrishnan, “An
acknowledgment-based approach for the detection of routing misbe-
havior in MANETs,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 6,
no. 5, pp. 536–550, 2007.
[113] J. von Mulert, I. Welch, and W. K. Seah, “Security threats and solutions
in MANETs: A case study using AODV and SAODV,” Journal of
Network and Computer Applications, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 1249–1259,
2012.
[114] F. Li, J. Wu, and A. Srinivasan, “Thwarting blackhole attacks in
disruption-tolerant networks using encounter tickets,” in Proc. IEEE
INFOCOM, 2009, pp. 2428–2436.
[115] G. Dini and A. L. Duca, “Towards a reputation-based routing protocol
to contrast blackholes in a delay tolerant network,” Ad Hoc Networks,
vol. 10, no. 7, pp. 1167 – 1178, 2012.
[116] Q. Li and G. Cao, “Mitigating routing misbehavior in disruption
tolerant networks,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 664–675, 2012.
[117] M. Alajeely, R. Doss, A. Ahmad, and V. Mak-Hau, “Catabolism attack
and anabolism defense: A novel attack and traceback mechanism in
opportunistic networks,” Computer Communications, vol. 71, pp. 111–
118, 2015.
[118] T. N. D. Pham and C. K. Yeo, “Detecting colluding blackhole and
greyhole attacks in delay tolerant networks,” IEEE Transactions on
Mobile Computing, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 1116–1129, 2016.
[119] S. Saha, S. Nandi, R. Verma, S. Sengupta, K. Singh, V. Sinha, and
S. K. Das, “Design of efficient lightweight strategies to combat DoS
attack in delay tolerant network routing,” Wireless Networks, pp. 1–22,
2016.
[120] H. Kim, R. B. Chitti, and J. Song, “Novel defense mechanism against
data flooding attacks in wireless ad hoc networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Consumer Electronics, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 579–582, 2010.
[121] B. Liu, J. Li, T. Wei, S. Berg, J. Ye, C. Li, C. Zhang, J. Zhang, and
X. Han, “SF-DRDoS: The store-and-flood distributed reflective denial
of service attack,” Computer Communications, vol. 69, pp. 107–115,
2015.
[122] Q. Li, W. Gao, S. Zhu, and G. Cao, “To lie or to comply: Defending
against flood attacks in disruption tolerant networks,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 168–
182, 2013.
[123] P. T. N. Diep and C. K. Yeo, “Detecting flooding attack while accom-
modating burst traffic in delay tolerant networks,” in Proc. Wireless
Telecommunications Symposium (WTS), 2017, pp. 1–7.
[124] I. Parris and T. Henderson, “Friend or flood? social prevention of
flooding attacks in mobile opportunistic networks,” in Proc. IEEE 34th
International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Work-
shops (ICDCSW), 2014, pp. 16–21.
[125] F. Nait-Abdesselam, B. Bensaou, and T. Taleb, “Detecting and avoiding
wormhole attacks in wireless ad hoc networks,” IEEE Communications
Magazine, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 127–133, 2008.
[126] Y. Ren, M. C. Chuah, J. Yang, and Y. Chen, “Detecting wormhole
attacks in delay-tolerant networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications,
vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 36–42, 2010.
[127] T. N. D. Pham and C. K. Yeo, “Statistical wormhole detection and
localization in delay tolerant networks,” in Proc. IEEE 11th Consumer
Communications and Networking Conference (CCNC), 2014, pp. 380–
385.
[128] H. Yu, P. B. Gibbons, M. Kaminsky, and F. Xiao, “SybilLimit: A
near-optimal social network defense against sybil attacks,” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 885–898, 2010.
[129] X. Lin, “LSR: Mitigating zero-day sybil vulnerability in privacy-
preserving vehicular peer-to-peer networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications, vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 237–246, 2013.
[130] S. Trifunovic and A. Hossmann-Picu, “Stalk and lie the cost of sybil
attacks in opportunistic networks,” Computer Communications, vol. 73,
Part A, pp. 66–79, 2016.
[131] X. Liang, X. Lin, and X. S. Shen, “Enabling trustworthy service eval-
uation in service-oriented mobile social networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 310–320, 2014.
[132] Y. Sun, L. Yin, and W. Liu, “Defending sybil attacks in mobile social
networks,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM WKSHPS, 2014, pp. 163–164.
[133] D. Quercia and S. Hailes, “Sybil attacks against mobile users: Friends
and foes to the rescue,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 2010, pp. 1–5.
[134] W. Chang, J. Wu, C. C. Tan, and F. Li, “Sybil defenses in mobile social
networks,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, 2013, pp. 641–646.
[135] K. Zhang, X. Liang, R. Lu, K. Yang, and X. S. Shen, “Exploiting
mobile social behaviors for sybil detection,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM,
2015, pp. 271–279.
[136] U. Shevade, H. H. Song, L. Qiu, and Y. Zhang, “Incentive-aware
routing in DTNs,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Network
Protocols, 2008, pp. 238–247.
[137] L. Buttyn, L. Dra, M. Flegyhzi, and I. Vajda, “Barter trade improves
message delivery in opportunistic networks,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 8,
no. 1, pp. 1–14, 2010.
[138] A. Krifa, C. Barakat, and T. Spyropoulos, “MobiTrade: Trading content
in disruption tolerant networks,” in Proc. 6th ACM Workshop on
Challenged Networks (CHANTS ’11), 2011, pp. 31–36.
[139] H. Zhou, J. Chen, J. Fan, Y. Du, and S. Das, “ConSub: Incentive-
based content subscribing in selfish opportunistic mobile networks,”
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 31, no. 9,
pp. 669–679, September 2013.
[140] Y. P. Hsu and L. Duan, “To motivate social grouping in wireless
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 16,
no. 8, pp. 4880–4893, 2017.
[141] L. Pu, X. Chen, J. Xu, and X. Fu, “D2D fogging: An energy-efficient
and incentive-aware task offloading framework via network-assisted
D2D collaboration,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communica-
tions, vol. 34, no. 12, pp. 3887–3901, 2016.
[142] N. Mastronarde, V. Patel, J. Xu, L. Liu, and M. van der Schaar, “To
relay or not to relay: Learning Device-to-Device relaying strategies in
cellular networks,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 15,
no. 6, pp. 1569–1585, 2016.
[143] L. Wei, Z. Cao, and H. Zhu, “MobiGame: A user-centric reputation
based incentive protocol for delay/disruption tolerant networks,” in
Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, 2011, pp. 1–5.
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, 2018 30
[144] B. M. C. Silva, J. J. P. C. Rodrigues, N. Kumar, M. L. Proenc¸a,
Jr., and G. Han, “MobiCoop: An incentive-based cooperation solution
for mobile applications,” ACM Trans. Multimedia Comput. Commun.
Appl., vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 1–23, Aug. 2016.
[145] M. Salehi and A. Boukerche, “A comprehensive reputation system
to improve the security of opportunistic routing protocols in wireless
networks,” in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, 2015, pp. 1–6.
[146] D. Yang, X. Fang, and G. Xue, “Game theory in cooperative commu-
nications,” IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 44–49,
2012.
[147] L. Song, D. Niyato, Z. Han, and E. Hossain, “Game-theoretic resource
allocation methods for device-to-device communication,” IEEE Wire-
less Communications, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 136–144, 2014.
[148] F. Wang, L. Song, Z. Han, Q. Zhao, and X. Wang, “Joint scheduling
and resource allocation for device-to-device underlay communication,”
in Proc. IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference
(WCNC), 2013, pp. 134–139.
[149] K. Sugiyama, T. Kubo, A. Tagami, and A. Parekh, “Incentive mech-
anism for DTN-based message delivery services,” in Proc. IEEE
GLOBECOM, 2013, pp. 3108–3113.
[150] Z. Chen, Y. Liu, B. Zhou, and M. Tao, “Caching incentive design in
wireless D2D networks: A stackelberg game approach,” in Proc. IEEE
International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2016, pp. 1–6.
[151] R. Yin, C. Zhong, G. Yu, Z. Zhang, K. K. Wong, and X. Chen, “Joint
spectrum and power allocation for D2D communications underlay-
ing cellular networks,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology,
vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 2182–2195, 2016.
[152] H. Wu and H. Ma, “Quality-oriented incentive mechanism for video
delivery in opportunistic networks,” in Proc. IEEE International Sym-
posium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks, 2014,
pp. 1–6.
[153] Q. Wang, W. Wang, S. Jin, H. Zhu, and N. T. Zhang, “Quality-
optimized joint source selection and power control for wireless mul-
timedia D2D communication using stackelberg game,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 64, no. 8, pp. 3755–3769, 2015.
[154] D. Wu, J. Yan, H. Wang, D. Wu, and R. Wang, “Social attribute aware
incentive mechanism for device-to-device video distribution,” IEEE
Transactions on Multimedia, vol. 19, no. 8, pp. 1908–1920, 2017.
[155] C. Xu, L. Song, Z. Han, Q. Zhao, X. Wang, and B. Jiao, “Interference-
aware resource allocation for device-to-device communications as
an underlay using sequential second price auction,” in Proc. IEEE
International Conference on Communications (ICC), 2012, pp. 445–
449.
[156] C. Xu, L. Song, Z. Han, Q. Zhao, X. Wang, X. Cheng, and B. Jiao,
“Efficiency resource allocation for device-to-device underlay commu-
nication systems: A reverse iterative combinatorial auction based ap-
proach,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 31,
no. 9, pp. 348–358, 2013.
[157] S. Huang, C. Yi, and J. Cai, “A sequential posted price mechanism
for D2D content sharing communications,” in Proc. IEEE Global
Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2016, pp. 1–6.
[158] M. H. Hajiesmaili, L. Deng, M. Chen, and Z. Li, “Incentivizing device-
to-device load balancing for cellular networks: An online auction
design,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 35,
no. 2, pp. 265–279, 2017.
[159] T. Ning, Z. Yang, X. Xie, and H. Wu, “Incentive-aware data dissem-
ination in delay-tolerant mobile networks,” in Proc. 8th Annual IEEE
Communications Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc
Communications and Networks, 2011, pp. 539–547.
[160] T. Ning, Z. Yang, H. Wu, and Z. Han, “Self-interest-driven incentives
for ad dissemination in autonomous mobile social networks,” in Proc.
IEEE INFOCOM, 2013, pp. 2310–2318.
[161] F. Wu, T. Chen, S. Zhong, C. Qiao, and G. Chen, “A game-theoretic
approach to stimulate cooperation for probabilistic routing in oppor-
tunistic networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications,
vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 1573–1583, 2013.
[162] Y. Li, J. Yu, C. Wang, Q. Liu, B. Cao, and M. Daneshmand, “A
novel bargaining based incentive protocol for opportunistic networks,”
in Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, 2012, pp. 5285–5289.
[163] B. Jedari, L. Liu, T. Qiu, A. Rahim, and F. Xia, “A game-theoretic
incentive scheme for social-aware routing in selfish mobile social
networks,” Future Generation Computer Systems, vol. 50, pp. 178–
190, 2017.
[164] Q. Xu, Z. Su, and S. Guo, “A game theoretical incentive scheme for
relay selection services in mobile social networks,” IEEE Transactions
on Vehicular Technology, vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 6692 – 6702, 2016.
[165] L. Li, Y. Qin, and X. Zhong, “A novel routing scheme for resource-
constraint opportunistic networks: A cooperative multiplayer bargain-
ing game approach,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology,
vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 6547–6561, 2016.
[166] Z. Han and H. V. Poor, “Coalition games with cooperative transmission:
a cure for the curse of boundary nodes in selfish packet-forwarding
wireless networks,” IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. 57,
no. 1, pp. 203–213, 2009.
[167] K. Akkarajitsakul, E. Hossain, and D. Niyato, “Cooperative packet
delivery in hybrid wireless mobile networks: A coalitional game
approach,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 12, no. 5,
pp. 840–854, 2013.
[168] R. Zhang, L. Song, Z. Han, X. Cheng, and B. Jiao, “Distributed
resource allocation for device-to-device communications underlaying
cellular networks,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Com-
munications (ICC), 2013, pp. 1889–1893.
[169] H. Zhu, Y. Cao, B. Liu, and T. Jiang, “Energy-aware incentive mecha-
nism for content sharing through device-to-device communications,” in
Proc. IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2016,
pp. 1–7.
[170] Y. Xiao, K. C. Chen, C. Yuen, Z. Han, and L. A. DaSilva, “A
bayesian overlapping coalition formation game for device-to-device
spectrum sharing in cellular networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 14, no. 7, pp. 4034–4051, 2015.
[171] Y. Zhao and W. Song, “A coalitional graph game for Device-to-Device
data dissemination with power budget constraints,” in Proc. IEEE
Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), 2017,
pp. 1–6.
[172] F. Wang, Y. Li, Z. Wang, and Z. Yang, “Social-community-aware
resource allocation for D2D communications underlaying cellular net-
works,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 65, no. 5,
pp. 3628–3640, 2016.
[173] Y. Cai, Y. Fan, and D. Wen, “An incentive-compatible routing protocol
for two-hop delay-tolerant networks,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 266–277, 2016.
[174] R. El-Azouzi, F. D. Pellegrini, H. B. Sidi, and V. Kamble, “Evo-
lutionary forwarding games in delay tolerant networks: Equilibria,
mechanism design and stochastic approximation,” Computer Networks,
vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 1003–1018, 2013.
[175] G. L. Cota, S. B. Mokhtar, G. Gianini, E. Damiani, J. Lawall, G. Muller,
and L. Brunie, “RACOON++: A semi-automatic framework for the
selfishness-aware design of cooperative systems,” IEEE Transactions
on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2017.
[176] Y. Wang, A. V. Vasilakos, and J. Ma, “VPEF: A simple and effective in-
centive mechanism in community-based autonomous networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Network and Service Management, vol. 12, no. 1, pp.
75–86, 2015.
[177] W. Chahin, H. B. A. Sidi, R. El-Azouzi, F. D. Pellegrini, and
J. Walrand, “Incentive mechanisms based on minority games in het-
erogeneous delay tolerant networks,” in Proc. 2013 25th International
Teletraffic Congress (ITC), 2013, pp. 1–9.
[178] J. Huang, Y. Yin, Y. Zhao, Q. Duan, W. Wang, and S. Yu, “A game-
theoretic resource allocation approach for intercell device-to-device
communications in cellular networks,” IEEE Transactions on Emerging
Topics in Computing, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 475–486, 2016.
[179] B. Barua, Z. Khan, Z. Han, A. A. Abouzeid, and M. Latva-aho,
“Incentivizing selected devices to perform cooperative content delivery:
A carrier aggregation-based approach,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 15, no. 7, pp. 5030–5045, 2016.
[180] J. Li, R. Bhattacharyya, S. Paul, S. Shakkottai, and V. Subrama-
nian, “Incentivizing sharing in realtime D2D streaming networks: A
mean field game perspective,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 3–17, 2017.
[181] T. Zhang, H. Wang, X. Chu, and J. He, “A signaling-based incentive
mechanism for device-to-device content sharing in cellular networks,”
IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 1377–1380, 2017.
[182] H. Zhu, X. Lin, R. Lu, Y. Fan, and X. Shen, “SMART: A secure
multilayer credit-based incentive scheme for delay-tolerant networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 58, no. 8, pp. 4628–
4639, 2009.
[183] R. Lu, X. Lin, H. Zhu, X. Shen, and B. Preiss, “Pi: A practical incentive
protocol for delay tolerant networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 1483–1493, 2010.
[184] H. Chen, W. Lou, Z. Wang, and Q. Wang, “A secure credit-based in-
centive mechanism for message forwarding in noncooperative DTNs,”
IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 6377–
6388, 2016.
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS & TUTORIALS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, 2018 31
[185] J. Zhou and Z. Cao, “TIS: A threshold incentive scheme for secure
and reliable data forwarding in vehicular delay tolerant networks,” in
Proc. IEEE GLOBECOM, 2012, pp. 985–990.
[186] Y. Wang, M. C. Chuah, and Y. Chen, “Incentive based data sharing
in delay tolerant mobile networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 370–381, 2014.
[187] X. Guan, C. Liu, M. Chen, H. Chen, and T. Ohtsuki, “Internal threats
avoiding based forwarding protocol in social selfish delay tolerant
networks,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Communications
(ICC), 2011, pp. 1–6.
[188] A. Mei and J. Stefa, “Give2Get: Forwarding in social mobile wireless
networks of selfish individuals,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 569–582, 2012.
[189] Z. Ning, L. Liu, F. Xia, B. Jedari, I. Lee, and W. Zhang, “CAIS: A
copy adjustable incentive scheme in community-based socially-aware
networking,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, vol. 66,
no. 4, pp. 3406–3419, 2017.
[190] T. Seregina, O. Brun, R. E. Azouzi, and B. J. Prabhu, “On the design
of a reward-based incentive mechanism for delay tolerant networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 453–465,
2017.
[191] S. Misra, S. Pal, and B. K. Saha, “Distributed information-based
cooperative strategy adaptationin opportunistic mobile networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 26, no. 3, pp.
724–737, 2015.
[192] X. Zhuo, W. Gao, G. Cao, and S. Hua, “An incentive framework for
cellular traffic offloading,” IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing,
vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 541–555, 2014.
[193] Y. Li, J. Zhang, X. Gan, L. Fu, H. Yu, and X. Wang, “A contract-
based incentive mechanism for delayed traffic offloading in cellular
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 15,
no. 8, pp. 5314–5327, 2016.
[194] S. T. Kouyoumdjieva and G. Karlsson, “Energy-aware opportunistic
mobile data offloading under full and limited cooperation,” Computer
Communications, vol. 84, pp. 84–95, 2016.
[195] Y. Zhang, L. Song, W. Saad, Z. Dawy, and Z. Han, “Contract-based
incentive mechanisms for device-to-device communications in cellu-
lar networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
vol. 33, no. 10, pp. 2144–2155, 2015.
[196] Y. Chen, S. He, F. Hou, Z. Shi, and J. Chen, “Promoting device-to-
device communication in cellular networks by contract-based incentive
mechanisms,” IEEE Network, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 14–20, 2017.
[197] Y. Pan, C. Pan, H. Zhu, Q. Z. Ahmed, M. Chen, and J. Wang, “On
consideration of content preference and sharing willingness in D2D as-
sisted offloading,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 978–993, 2017.
[198] B. Jedari, F. Xia, H. Chen, S. K. Das, A. Tolba, and Z. Almakhadmeh,
“A social-based watchdog system to detect selfish nodes in opportunis-
tic mobile networks,” Future Generation Computer Systems, vol. PP,
no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2017.
